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Abstract
Emotional facial expressions are potent social signals that can change
people’s feeling states and shape judgments of targets that are unrelated to the
expressions. Whether they originate from other individuals or advertisements in
the environment, facial expressions are undoubtedly one of the most prominent
emotional stimuli. Thus, there is a great need to examine how facial expressions
can influence potentially consequential judgments and decisions that involve
uncertain or risky prospects, as such decisions are greatly impacted by emotion.
The domains of finance and health could particularly benefit from such an
examination. In the financial domain, expressions of other individuals could shape
investment behavior. For instance, facial expressions may trigger emotional
reactions that can focus an individual on either the unwanted consequences or
benefits of a risky option. In the health domain, individuals’ evaluations of the
risks and benefits associated with a medical treatment could be guided by the
emotionality depicted on the face of a doctor. This second domain has particular
relevance to older individuals due to their greater preference for positively over
negatively valenced stimuli and the importance of effectively promoting
preventative health behaviors for older adults.
Thus, two studies were conducted in order to examine the role of
emotional facial expressions in judgments and decisions involving risk in the
financial and health domains. The first study examined whether the posing of
positive (happiness), negative (fear), and neutral facial expressions could
influence participants’ affective responding and ultimately their sub-optimal risk-
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taking and risk-avoidant behavior in a financial investment task. In Study 1, the
facial posing manipulation did not have the intended effect on participants’
changes in self-reported valence. Specifically, in the neutral-posing condition,
participants reported the greatest increase in negative valence and demonstrated
significantly greater sub-optimal risk aversion in comparison to the fear-posing
condition. Furthermore, significant relations between participants’ facial
responding and sub-optimal risk seeking behavior were discovered in the neutral
posing condition. Specifically, decreased corrugator and increased zygomaticus
activity in response to affectively neutral expressions in the neutral-posing
condition was related to increased risk seeking. This relationship between fEMG
activity and risk seeking was consistent with previously described relations
between positive and negative affective and risk seeking. Thus, fEMG may be a
useful tool when attempting to evaluate how individuals’ affective responses to
stimuli relate to their risk seeking behavior in financial decision tasks.
The second study explored whether spontaneous facial responses to
emotional facial expressions presented during an influenza vaccine commercial
could change participants’ evaluations (behavioral intentions, risk perceptions,
and integral feelings) regarding the flu vaccine. Importantly, this study included
older and younger adults to examine whether aging-related increases in the
preference for positive over negative information could lead to differential
influences of positive and negative facial expressions on the above-mentioned
evaluations. Manipulating the facial expressions in the commercial had a
significant, albeit unpredicted effect on participants’ evaluations. Relative to those
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who watched the smiling doctors, older and younger adults who watched the
concerned doctors felt better about the vaccine. Furthermore, older adults who
watched the smiling doctors reported greater increases in worry about contracting
the flu in comparison to those who watched the concerned doctors. Overall,
findings of Study 2 suggest that concerned rather than happy facial expressions
should accompany messages that are aimed at increasing vaccination behavior.

4
General Introduction
Until recent decades, decision-making theorists posited that decisions
with uncertain outcomes were navigated solely by weighing the probabilities and
severity of favorable and unfavorable outcomes (e.g., Savage 1954). Such
accounts were modified through the realization that affective processes influence
rational calculations of risk in numerous ways (for review see: Lerner, Li,
Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2014). Importantly, two manifestations of affect can
influence risk-related decisions and judgments (i.e., subjective assessments of a
target’s potential for harm or benefit). Integral affect arises in response to one or
more components of a decision (see e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio,
1996; Schwarz & Clore, 2007; Slovic, Peters, & Finucace, 2005). In contrast,
incidental affect originates from a source that is unrelated to the current task yet
can infiltrate the decision process (see e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Tiedens &
Linton, 2001). Incidental affect can lead to unintended consequences for decision
makers as it can operate under the radar of one’s awareness to influence their
perception of probabilistic information (e.g., Caruso & Shaﬁr, 2006; Constans, &
Mathews, 1993; Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans, 1992). Given the
influence of affect on perceived probabilities, judgments and decisions involving
risk are particularly vulnerable to incidental affect (Chou, Lee, & Ho, 2007;
Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Wright & Bower, 1992).
Given the potential for incidental affect to bias some of our most
consequential decisions, it is paramount to better understand how incidental affect
can influence our responses to risks when managing our finances and physical
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health. For instance, an incidental negative state can motivate one to avoid future
losses, thus promoting a risk-averse strategy. Moreover, in the treatment domain,
incidental positive affect may divert attention away from information highlighting
the potential for unwanted outcomes such as side effects.
Beyond examining how incidental affect guides judgments and decisions
involving risk, it is also critical to study the most prominent sources of incidental
affect. One of the most common and ecologically valid sources of incidental
affect are emotional facial expressions. Few emotional stimuli are as evident in
everyday circumstances as are emotional facial expressions (Dimberg, Thunberg,
& Elmehed, 2000; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). Given their ubiquity and
prominence in our social environment, it is surprising that so few studies have
examined the influence of facial expressions on risk-related evaluations or
decisions. Converging evidence suggest that facial expressions can create an
affective context that may be sufficient enough to impact risk-related decision
making (e.g., Habib, Cassotti, Moutier, Houdé, & Borst, 2015). For instance,
viewing facial expressions can elicit emotional experiences (Lishner, Cooter, &
Zald, 2008; Schneider, Gur, Gur, & Muenz, 1994). There is also considerable
evidence that people automatically mimic observed facial expressions (for
discussion see: Hess, Philippot, & Blairy, 1999) and experience the corresponding
affective state through an embodied process called facial feedback (e.g., Cannon
Hayes & Tipper, 2009; Hess & Blairy, 2001; Moody & McIntosh, 2006).
Furthermore, emotional facial stimuli can influence evaluations of targets
unrelated to the expression (Murphy, & Zajonc, 1993; Ottati, Terkildsen, &
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Hubbard, 1997) and can even influence consumption behavior (Winkielman,
Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005).
Based on the converging findings from the multiple research areas that are
cited above, it is likely that both posed expressions and spontaneous reactions to
facial stimuli will influence risk-related decision-making in the consequential
domains of health and finance. To test this prediction, two experiments were
conducted in order to examine the role of emotional facial expressions in riskrelated judgments and decisions. The first study examined whether modeling
positive (happiness) or negative (fear) versus neutral facial expressions could
influence risk-taking and risk-avoidant behavior in a financial investment task.
The second study examined whether spontaneous facial reactions to emotional
expressions presented during an influenza vaccine commercial could change
participants’ evaluations (behavioral intentions, risk perceptions, and integral
feelings) regarding the flu vaccine. Importantly, this study included older and
younger adult samples to examine whether age-related preferences for positive
over negative information would lead to differential influences of positive and
negative facial expressions on the above-mentioned evaluations.
Prior to discussing the unique rationale for each study, the following
sections will review literature that is only relevant to both of the present
experiments. The review begins by explaining how incidental affect relates to
risk-related judgments and decisions. Next, the review focuses on the influences
and measurement of facial expressions in social, emotional, and evaluative
contexts.
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Incidental Affect and Risk
Incidental affect can take the form of mood states (affective states that
have lingered over from recent experiences), influences from the immediate
environment, and/or the dispositional affective characteristics of an individual
(Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Although incidental affect is unrelated to the present
choice, it can have consequences for judgments and evaluations. Previous
theoretical perspectives and empirical studies have outlined several ways that
moods and other forms of incidental affect can impact the perception and/or
selection of risky options. Specifically, incidental affect can “color” our
perceptions and memory, change the process by which decisions are made, and
alter our goals in a decision environment (for reviews see Winkielman, Knutson,
Paulus, & Trujillo, 2007). It should be noted that the following two paragraphs
discuss the effects of incidental affective states on judgments and decisions even
though such effects are applicable to integral and incidental affect.
Incidental affect can alter cognitive processes such as the attention to,
encoding, or retrieval of information. Regarding attention, incidental affect may
focus an individual on aspects of the environment that correspond with an
affective state (Weber et al., 2005). According to the Affect Infusion Model
(AIM), such selective attention is thought to be concordant with a current moodstate. For instance, positive moods tend to focus attention toward the potential
benefits and away from the downsides of a risky option (Forgas, 1994, 1995).
Incidental affect can also influence how memory for information is encoded and
retrieved (e.g., Bower, 1981, Matthews, Pitcaithly, & Mann, 1995; Watkins,
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Vache, Verney, & Mathews, 1996), and thus can have consequences in risk taking
tasks that involve learning or accessing previous knowledge that is necessary to
ascertain the riskiness of an option. For example, negative incidental affective
states can trigger affectively-similarly information in memory (Bower, 1981).
Next, incidental affect can alter how deeply and deliberately decisions are
processed. Several theorists have argued that the human thought processes are
guided by the requirements that are demanded by a certain situation (King &
Hicks, 2009; Schwarz, 2011). People tend to feel good in the absence of threat or
after attaining a positive outcome. Thus, such positive affective states can signal
that “all is well” and are not often associated with the need for greater
deliberation. Alternately, people tend to feel bad in problematic situations that
require deliberate actions and thus negative affect is often associated with more
deliberate processing. In summary, incidental positive affect can trigger more
intuitive processing, whereas incidental negative states may result in a “bottomup” processing strategy that involves a systematic attention to detail (King,
Burton, Hicks, & Drigotas, 2007, King & Hicks, 2009; Schwarz, 2011). Lastly,
incidental affective states can lead to specific appraisals that inspire action
tendencies or other motivations that may change one’s goal in a decision scenario
(Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Lerner, Small, Loewenstein, 2004; Schaller, & Cialdini,
1990).
Importantly, incidental affect can be mistaken as integral affect that has
been elicited by task-relevant characteristics such as choice options or the
anticipation of an outcome (Schwarz, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Wilson &

9
Daly, 2004). Such a misattribution is likely, given that incidental affect has been
shown to impact decision making regardless of one's conscious awareness of it
during decision process (e.g., Caruso & Shaﬁr, 2006). Once incidental affect is
mistaken for integral affect, it can influence judgments and decisions in a manner
that is usually unique to the integral affect.
Integral affect typically arises as affective evaluations of previous
experiences with similar task characteristics are incorporated into the decision
process in order to improve future choices (i.e., the affect as information
perspective: Schwarz, 2002, 2011). Popular evidence from physiological research
exemplifies this phenomenon and highlights the function of bodily responses
during risky decision making. Bechara and colleagues (1996) demonstrated that
optimal performance in gambling tasks resulted from “somatic markers”, as
measured by skin conductance responses, elicited prior to the selection of an
option that previously yielded unfavorable outcomes. Over time, these
anticipatory integral responses guided individuals with normal brain functioning
away from unfavorable choices. Furthermore, according to research supporting
the affect heuristic (e.g., Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic &
Johnson, 2000), positive integral feelings toward decision targets are often
associated with higher perceived benefits and lower perceived risk. In contrast,
negative integral feelings toward decision targets result in lower perceived
benefits and higher risk perceptions.
The above section summarizes the primary ways that incidental affect can
bias our judgments of uncertain prospects and ultimately our decision strategy
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when faced with a risky choice. Historically, research on the specific effects of
incidental affect in risk-related behaviors has examined either the affective
dimensions of valence and arousal or discrete emotions (e.g., happiness, and fear).
Thus, the following review of empirical findings on the role of incidental affect in
risk-related decision making will be organized according to the distinction
between affective dimensions (valence and arousal) and discrete emotions.
The role of incidental valence. Circumplex models of affect (Russell, 1980)
conceptualize affect as consisting of two underlying components: valence
(positive vs. negative) and arousal (degree of autonomic nervous system
activation associated with an emotional response). Some researchers propose that
such an unpacking of affect can lead to a more nuanced understanding of the role
of affect in risk taking (e.g. Mano, 1992, 1994). Supporting this proposition,
studies that operationally defined and measured affect in terms of positively and
negatively valenced states have yielded significant findings. Contrasting the
effects of negative affect, positive affect (either measured or manipulated) has
been related to more optimistic expectations for obtaining favorable outcomes
(e.g., Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Mayer et al., 1992). In an early example, Johnson
and Tversky (1983) presented participants with either tragic or happy newspaper
articles. Participants exposed to the tragic reports provided higher risk estimates
for a series of undesirable events (e.g., fires, floods, and causes of death) in
comparison to participants who saw happy news reports. In a later study, Wright
and Bower (1992) reported that participants in a positive mood overestimated the
probability of positive events and underestimated the probability of negative
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events. Participants reporting negative mood states overestimated the probability
of negative events and underestimated the probability of positive events. Few, if
any, studies have examined the role of incidental valence on actual risk-taking,
yet some studies have examined how induced mood states influenced hypothetical
risk-taking. Yuen & Lee (2003) found that participants induced to feel negative
moods were more conservative in their willingness to take risks than those in a
positive or neutral mood. Similarly, Chou et al. (2007), induced participants into
either positive, negative, or neutral mood states and found that both older and
younger adults were more likely to take hypothetical risks in positive compared to
the negative moods.
In summary, the above findings generally support mood-congruent effects of
incidental affect on risk-related judgments and decision. Generally speaking,
incidental positive affect states increase the weight given to positive aspects of an
uncertain situation and thus relate to lower perceptions of risk and an increased
tendency toward risks. In contrast, negative affect leads to an increased
consideration of the negative aspects of risky situations, which relates to higher
perceptions of risk and lower tendencies toward risk taking.
The role of incidental arousal. The experience of the arousal dimension of
affect reflects the degree of autonomic nervous system activity and is considered
the degree of activation that is associated with an affective response. Arousal can
be measured on a scale that ranges from extreme calm or sleepiness at one pole, to
intense states such as excitement at the other (Lang et al., 1993; Russell, Weiss, &
Mendelsohn,1989). In decision making research, incidental arousal has been
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associated with both risk perception and risk taking (e.g., Ariely & Loewenstein,
2006; Mano, 1994). Mano (1994) demonstrated that individuals who reported
experiencing higher levels of arousal were more prone to risky behavior as
measured by their increased willingness to pay for lottery tickets but lower
willingness to pay for insurance. Similarly, Ariely and Loewenstein (2006) found
that incidentally induced states of high arousal were related to an increased
willingness to participate in risky hypothetical behaviors. Regarding more integral
influences of arousal, considerable research has measured physiological markers
of autonomic arousal (e.g. heart rate and galvanic skin response) during various
gambling (Bechara et al., 1997) and investment activities (for review see Lo &
Repin, 2002). These studies suggest that physiological measures of arousal predict
adaptive decision strategies that reduce sub-optimal risk taking in order to prevent
unwanted losses.
The role of incidental discrete emotions. Purely “dimensional”
conceptualizations of affective valence have historically been criticized by
discrete emotion theorists for their inability to discriminate among qualitatively
different states that are both high in arousal and negative valence (for review see:
Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, & Ellsworth, 2007). Lerner & Keltner’s appraisaltendency theory (2000) posits that discrete emotions can be similar in valence and
arousal yet can lead to different judgments and decisions due to the unique
cognitive/behavioral predispositions or action tendencies that are associated with
the specific appraisals of discrete emotions. For instance, fear stems from
appraisals of uncertainty and lower situational control, whereas anger and
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happiness originate from appraisals of certainty (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The
appraisals of uncertainty that are motivated by fearful states increase perceptions
of risk and lead to risk avoidant behavior. In contrast, the appraisals of certainty
associated with anger decrease risk perceptions and increase risk-seeking (Lerner
& Keltner, 2001).
Across multiple studies, incidental fear and anxiety have been related to
increased risk estimates and risk-avoidant preferences (Lerner & Keltner, 2001;
Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). Raghunathan and Pham (1999) induced participants
into states of anxiety and sadness and found that more anxious states predicted
increased preferences for low-risk, low-reward options in work-related and
gambling scenarios. Sad mood states had the opposite effect of anxious states.
Demonstrating further differentiation between negative emotions and their
influence on risk evaluations, Lerner and Keltner (2001) found that individuals
induced to feel fear made less optimistic estimates regarding future events.
Relative to fearful individuals those in angry states had reduced risk estimates and
demonstrated increased risk seeking in unrelated domains. In a similar study,
Lerner and colleagues (2003) found that participants who were made to
experience fear (about terrorism) evaluated unrelated negative outcomes (e.g.,
getting the flu) as more probable in comparison to individuals who were made to
feel angry. These findings were consistent for both experimentally induced and
naturally occurring forms of the emotions (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischoff,
2003).
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In summary, both dimensional (valence and arousal) and discrete emotion
conceptualizations of incidental affect can predict risk-related judgments and
decisions. Future research should thus continue to examine how risk-related
decision making is influenced by incidental discrete positive and negative
emotions in addition to general positive and negative affective states. Although
numerous cues in the environment (even those that are minimally perceptible) can
influence incidental affective sates (e.g., Niedenthal & Kitayama, 1994;
Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994), the next section discusses an influential and
prominent source of incidental affect that has been under examined in decision
making research.
Emotional Facial Expressions, Affect, and Subjective Evaluations
Facial expressions have long been considered to be a potent source of
affective information and influence. For instance, viewing facial expressions can
elicit emotional experiences that correspond with the viewed expression (Lishner,
Cooter, & Zald, 2008; Schneider, Gur, Gur, & Muenz, 1994). There is even some
evidence to suggest that compared to other types of emotional stimuli, facial
stimuli are more affectively impactful in terms of their ability to trigger a
physiological responses associated with core affective systems (Larsen, Norris, &
Cacioppo, 2003).
Beyond altering a perceiver’s affective state, the viewing of emotional
faces has been found to influence unrelated behaviors (Winkielman, Berridge, &
Wilbarger, 2005), evaluations (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993), and processing styles
(Ottati et al., 1997). Such influences are examined using affective priming
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paradigms. In such paradigms, facial expressions or other emotional stimuli are
shown to participants who are then asked to evaluate a target or perform a
behavior. Even the subliminal presentation of facial expressions has influenced
various evaluations (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Niedenthal, 1990, Niedenthal &
Setterlund, 1994) and approach-avoidance behaviors (Winkielman et al., 2005).
For example, participants exposed to subliminally presented smiles poured and
drank more of a new beverage, whereas subliminally presented frowns had the
opposite effect (Winkielman et al., 2005). Importantly, facial expressions seem to
be unique among affective stimuli in their ability to motivate approach-avoidance
behaviors (Starr, Gogolushko, & Winkielman, 2008).
An important question remains as to how emotional facial expressions are
able to change the way we feel and how we evaluate things in our environment.
One possible process through which the facial expressions of other individuals
can impact our own feelings is emotion contagion (Hatfield et al., 1994;
Parkinson & Simons, 2009). This affective transference can occur when an
observer automatically mimics the emotional facial expression of another
individual (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; Wallbott, 1991). The
mimicked movements are then theorized to trigger corresponding feeling states
via an embodied process outlined by the facial feedback hypothesis (Adelmann, &
Zajonc, 1989). According to this hypothesis, subtle contractions of muscles in a
perceivers face change emotional states as the brain receives afferent muscular
feedback signals from the face.
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Darwin is credited with formulating the first hypotheses regarding the
differential influence of positive and negative facial expressions on evaluations
(Darwin, 1872/2005). Fear and anger were suggested to signal unfavorable
conditions, whereas expressions of happiness were proposed to signal favorable
conditions. More recently, researchers have explored how posed facial
expressions influence various cognitive and affective processes.
Consistent results support the facial feedback hypothesis, or in other
words, the proposition that activation of certain facial muscles changes the
experience of affect or other autonomic system activity (Larsen, Kasimatis, &
Frey, 1992; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990; McIntosh, 1996). When an
individual’s facial muscle activity is inhibited by cosmetic procedures (i.e.,
BOTOX), they are less influenced by emotional videos in comparison to those
who received injections of a substance that had no effect on their facial muscles
(Davis, Senghas, Brandt, & Ochsner, 2010). Furthermore, requiring participants
to pose facial expressions influences their self-reported affective states in the
direction corresponding with the posed expression (e.g., Duclos, Laird, Schneider,
Sexter, Stern, & VanLighten, 1989). Other studies have demonstrated that posing
or inhibiting emotional facial expressions can alter the perception of emotional
stimuli as well as judgments of other targets (e.g., Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski,
Lucarelli, & Davidson, 2010; Niedenthal, Brauer, Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker,
2001; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). For instance, Strack et al., (1988) found
that participants rated cartoons more favorably when pressing a pencil between
their teeth (in a manner that formed their mouth into a smile) as opposed to their
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lips (in a manner that inhibited smiling). These findings are supported by accounts
of embodied cognition, which suggest that the activation of sensorimotor cortex in
the brain is imperative for some emotional processes (Nicotra, Critchley, Mathias,
& Dolan, 2006; Winkielman, Niedenthal, & Oberman, 2008) and can impact riskrelated decision making as the brain reacts to signals sent by the body (Bechara,
Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994).
These above-mentioned studies and theoretical perspectives suggest that
self-posed and incidentally presented facial expressions should be as effective as
the affective manipulations used in previous research examining the role of affect
on risk-related decision making. The present investigation will thus attempt to
bias risk-related judgments and decisions with the use of emotional facial
expressions. To best examine how facial responses to emotional expressions are
involved in such biases, it is imperative to have a precise and objective measure
of facial responding. Therefore, facial electromyography will be used in the
present research as the measure of facial responding during the affective
manipulations used in the tasks. The next sections will highlight the utility of
measuring facial activity in order to assess affective responding in the current
project.
Facial electromyography (EMG). Facial EMG is a tool frequently used
to assess affect via measuring facial muscle movements. Despite the limited use
of facial EMG in decision making research, the following review will highlight
the utility of such a measure. Emotion theorists have long posited that facial
expressions of emotion are evoked spontaneously and automatically and that
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some facial expressions can be used to interpret internal feeling states (Dimberg
& Öhman, 1996; Ekman & Rosenberg 1997; Tomkins, 1962). EMG is a valid
and reliable indicator of both the observable and unseen movements of facial
muscles (e.g., Tassinary, Cacioppo, & Geen, 1989). Activations of facial muscles
have consistently been associated with affective and physiological states (Ekman,
Davidson & Friesen, 1990; Ekman, Levenson & Friesen, 1983, Rosenberg &
Ekman, 1994). For example, the corrugator supercilii, the muscle that pulls the
brow downward and together, is reliably activated when individuals report
experiencing negative affect. The zygomaticus major is the muscle that pulls the
mouth corners back and up to form a smile and is commonly associated with
positive affect (Bonanno & Keltner, 1997; Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang,
2001; Brown & Schwartz, 1980; Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1993; Hess, Banse, &
Kappas, 1995). These two muscles are also automatically and rapidly elicited by
emotional stimuli (Dimberg et al., 2000). Furthermore, researchers have
discovered reliable patterns of responses to the valence of multiple kinds of
emotional stimuli (e.g., words and faces; Larsen, Norris, & Cacioppo, 2003).
Studies using emotional images find that the corrigator supercillii muscle is
activated in response to unpleasant pictures and inhibited by positive pictures
(Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm,
1993) whereas the reverse pattern was observed for the zygomaticus muscle.
Larsen, Norris, and Cacioppo (2003) measured fEMG while female participants
viewed and later provided self-reported affective responses to positively and
negatively valenced pictures, sounds, and words. Self-reported positive affective
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responding was positively related to zygomaticus activation. Researchers have
even used facial EMG as a measure of affective responses to positively and
negatively framed radio messages (Bolls, Lang, & Potter, 2001). Importantly,
there is evidence that corrugator activation might be a better measure of valence
given the stronger effect of valence on corrugator, in comparison to zygomaticus
activity (Larsen et al., 2003). This is further corroborated by some
neurophysiological evidence which suggests that due to the corrugator’s
relatively sparse representation in the motor cortex (involved in the conscious
control over display rules), the muscle may even be a more implicit measure of
emotional valence than the zygomaticus major (Larsen et al., 2003).
The next sections will introduce specific rationale for examining the
influence of facial expressions on risk-related behavior. The rationale for Study 1
justifies examining the influence of posed facial expressions on financial risktaking. Subsequently, the rationale for Study 2 provides reasoning justifying the
examination of how incidentally-presented facial expressions may influence riskperceptions and other evaluations of medical treatments.
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Study 1: The Role of Incidental Positive and Negative Affect on Risky
Investment Behavior
Rationale for Study 1
Given the robust influence of incidental affect on people’s evaluations of
and responses to uncertain prospects (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2001), it is
imperative to understand how facial expressions, a frequently occurring source of
emotional influence, can bias our decisions in the consequential domain of
financial decision making. Recent evidence suggests that the viewing of facial
expressions can impact gambling behavior (e.g., Habib et al., 2015). Although this
research suggests that viewing facial expressions is sufficient to create an
affective context that can influence risk taking, more research is needed to
examine how the expressions present on one’s own face can influence complex
decision making involving risk.
As stated above, multiple studies demonstrate that individuals in incidental
positive (compared to negative) valenced states viewed their probability of
obtaining gains more optimistically even when the feeling was unrelated to their
decision. Alternately, individuals reporting higher levels of incidental negative
affect overestimated the likelihood of negative outcomes and underestimated the
likelihood of positive outcomes (e.g., Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Wright &
Bower, 1992). Other work has investigated the role of specific discrete emotions
and their impact on risky decisions (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Raghunathan &
Pham, 1999). For instance, incidental fearful (versus angry and happy) states
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resulted in less optimistic estimates regarding future events and greater degrees of
risk-averse choices (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).
Although facial expressions are common sources of affective influence,
researchers have only recently began to examine how facial expressions can
impact risk-related decision making. Habib, Cassotti and colleagues (2015) found
that individuals presented with fearful and angry faces responded differently to
the choice between a sure gain and a risky gamble. When faced with such a
choice, participants in the fear face condition were less risk taking than those in
the angry condition. Such findings corroborate the predictions made by the
appraisal tendency theory regarding the appraisal-driven behaviors associated
with discrete negative emotions. This study demonstrates that facial expressions
can serve as a source of incidental affect and bias risk-related decisions. Still, no
published studies have examined how posing facial expressions on one’s own
face can influence risk-related evaluations or decisions.
Evidence supporting the facial feedback hypothesis suggests that posed
facial expressions reliably induce affective states (Duclos et al., 1989; Larsen et
al., 1992; Levenson et al., 1990; McIntosh, 1996). Furthermore, the effects of
facial feedback have been found to be strongest when the facial configurations
match expressions of basic emotions (Levenson et al., 1990; Soussignan, 2002).
Moreover, other research has demonstrated that posing emotional facial
expressions can alter evaluations of unrelated stimuli (e.g., Niedenthal et al.,
2001; Strack et al., 1988). The question remains as to whether emotional facial
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expressions are capable of influencing more complex behavior such as risk taking
in the consequential financial domain.
Present Study
The present study examined the effects of a within-subject affective
manipulation on subsequent risky decision making in an investment task. The
manipulation required participants to imitate positive (happiness), negative (fear),
or neutral facial expressions prior to making choices among three options: two
high-risk, high-payoff stocks and a safe, yet low-payoff bond. The Behavioral
Investment Allocation Strategy (BIAS) task was chosen for the present
experiment as the performance of individuals in the task has previously been
related to real-life measures of assets and debt (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005;
Samanez-Larkin, Kuhnen, Yoo, & Knutson, 2010). The BIAS task requires
participants to repeatedly choose among a good stock, a bad stock, and a bond
without explicit knowledge of which stock is more optimal. Furthermore, just like
in the real stock market, participants see how both stocks performed after every
investment choice. This feedback adds to the ecological validity of the task. In
addition, the feedback allows participants to adjust their investment strategy based
on the expected value of each stock. Once the expected value of one stock is
clearly higher than the other stock, the selection of the low-payoff bond would be
considered a risk-averse error. Alternately, when the expected values of the stocks
are equal, the selection of either stock would be considered a risk-taking error
given that both stocks are equally likely to result in a loss. This task is
advantageous for examining the role of positive and negative affect on risk
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seeking as it allows for the examination of both risk-taking and risk-averse
behavior.
Importantly, in order to determine the effectiveness of the emotion
induction manipulations, participants completed an Affect Grid prior to and after
each emotion induction as a manipulation check. As an additional manipulation
check, fEMG measures of corrugator and zygomaticus activity were examined
during the facial imitation procedure to ensure that participants were following
the directions.
Based on findings from Lerner and Keltner’s (2000) experiments on the
role of incidental emotion on risk perception, participants were predicted to be
less risk-taking and more risk-averse in the fear condition (compared to the happy
and neutral conditions) as fear is associated with an appraisal of uncertainty and
desire to mitigate loss. In contrast, participants were predicted to be more risktaking in the happy condition (compared to the neutral and negative conditions) as
happy states are associated with certainty and a tendency to approach risks.
In addition to serving as manipulation checks, the self-reported and
physiologically-measured affective variables were also examined in their capacity
to moderate the effect of the facial posing condition on risky decision making. For
instance, participants who responded to the positive emotion induction procedure
with a greater (versus lesser) change in positive valence (either measured via the
Affect Grid or zygomaticus activity) were expected to more closely behave in the
manner corresponding to the affective state. Thus in this example, they were
expected to be more risk taking.
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Hypotheses
HI. It was predicted that there would be a main effect of the within-subject
emotion manipulation on participants’ investment behavior in the BIAS task.
Specifically, relative to their performance in the negative (fear) and neutral
conditions, participants were expected to make more risk-taking mistakes and
fewer risk-averse mistakes in the positive affect (happy) condition. In contrast,
relative to their performance in the positive (happy) and neutral conditions,
participants were predicted to make more risk-averse,mistakes and less risk-taking
mistakes in the negative (fear) condition.
HII. It was further predicted that the magnitude of participants’ facial
responses to the stimuli and/or their changes in self-reported affect from before to
after the stimuli would interact with the facial posing condition in order to
influence their investment behavior. Specifically, participants who responded to
the positive emotion induction procedure with a greater (versus lesser) change in
positive valence (either measured via the Affect Grid or zygomaticus activity)
were expected to demonstrate more risk-taking mistakes and fewer risk-averse
mistakes. Alternately, participants who responded to the negative emotion
induction procedure with a greater (versus lesser) change in negative valence
(measured via the Affect Grid and corrugator activity) were expected to
demonstrate fewer risk-taking mistakes and more risk-averse mistakes
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Methods
Sample
Forty younger adults were recruited from the DePaul University SONA
system subject pool and were compensated for their time via course credit. Two
participants did not complete the entire procedure and the physiological data from
another two participants was unusable due to technical malfunctions. Data from
those four participants was excluded from the analyses resulting in a final sample
of 36 participants (27 female) with an average age of 21.38.
Measures
The Affect Grid (Appendix A). The Affect Grid (Russell, Weiss, &
Mendelsohn, 1989) was developed based on the Circumplex Model of Affect,
which aims to represent a person’s current affective state on a two dimensional
graph with valence on the x-axis (anchored with “unpleasant” on the left and
“pleasant” on the right) and arousal on the y-axis (anchored with “sleepiness” on
the bottom and “high arousal” on the top). The Affect Grid instructs participants
to rate how they are feeling at that present moment by placing a single mark on
the nine by nine grid, thus allowing them to quickly report their state affect and
valence with a single response. The participant’s valence score is taken as the
number of the box that is marked, with the boxes numbered from 1 to 9 along the
horizontal axis. The arousal score is taken as the number of the box that is
marked, with the boxes numbered from 1 to 9 along the vertical axis. The Affect
Grid was previously validated with other measures of state emotion such as the
PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).
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Numeracy. Numeracy is the ability to comprehend and work with
quantitative information (Peters et al., 2006). Previous research has stressed the
importance of comprehending numeric information in risky decision-making
(e.g., Peters, 2012). Individuals high in numeracy have demonstrated reduced
susceptibility to emotionally-driven framing effects (De Martino, Kumaran,
Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Peters et al., 2006). It is therefore a concern that
numeracy may modulate the effect of an emotion induction procedure.
Specifically, highly numerate individuals may be resistant to the effects of the
emotion induction. Numeracy was thus measured using an 11-item measure
(Lipkus , Samsa, & Rimer, 2001) and included as a covariate in all analyses of
decision making behavior in order to assess and control for individual differences
in the ability to comprehend numeric information (see Appendix C).
Modified Behavioral Investment Allocation Strategy (BIAS) task. The
present study utilized a modified version of the BIAS task (Kuhnen & Knutson,
2005; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2010). The task was modified to include a withinparticipant emotion manipulation in order to study the effects of emotion
induction on risky financial decision-making. The BIAS task is an investment task
in which participants try to earn as much money as possible. At the beginning of
the task, participants were informed that the task involves choosing between two
risky options with variable chances of gaining/losing large amounts of money
(stocks) and a sure option for gaining small amounts of money (bond). They were
then informed that over each block of ten trials, there is a clear good and bad
stock and that they must determine which is which in order to maximize their
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winnings. After ten trials, the good and bad stocks would be randomly reassigned. Participants were further instructed that, on average, the good stock had
a 50% probability of gaining $10, a 25% probability of neither a gain nor a loss,
and a 25% probability of losing $10, whereas the bad stock had a 25% probability
of gaining $10, a 25% probability of neither a gain nor a loss, and a 50%
probability of losing $10. The outcome of the bond was consistently set at a 100%
chance of gaining $1. This payoff structure was consistent across all blocks.
For the purpose of this study, the task was modified to include two
emotion induction conditions (happiness and fear) and a neutral control condition.
Participants completed three blocks of 10 trials for each of the three conditions
(total of 90 trials). The order of the conditions was counterbalanced across
participants, yet all three blocks of the same condition occurred one after the other
in order to maximize the effect of the emotion induction. The participants’
earnings were reset after each facial posing condition. Prior to the beginning of
each block, participants completed the emotion induction task (described below)
that corresponded to the given condition.
After the emotion induction procedure, the 10 trials began. At the
beginning of each trial, participants were first presented with a two-second-long
anticipation screen displaying the following options from left to right: a stock, a
bond, and another stock. The following screen presented the word “choose” above
the three options, during which participants had four seconds to choose which
asset they would prefer (by pressing the corresponding key on the keyboard).
Once the participant made their decision, there was a brief 2-second wait period
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that was followed by a 4-second screen displaying their earnings (or losses) for
that trial in addition to their total earnings for the task. Finally, participants were
shown the outcomes of each of the three possible assets for that trial for 4
seconds. This feedback was designed to help participants assess which of the
stocks was more optimal in the given block.
Facial-posing emotion induction task. The procedure used to induce
changes in affective experience was developed for the purpose of this study. Each
administration of this induction began with a pre-test Affect Grid (Russell et al.,
1989) to establish the participants’ baseline valence and arousal. Next,
participants were informed that they were going to evaluate the intensity of facial
expressions and that they should do their best to imitate the expression for the full
duration that the face was presented. Prior to each face, participants were exposed
to a blank screen for 10 seconds. This period was used to collect baseline
physiological measures. After the blank screen, participants were presented with a
facial expression for 10 seconds. During this period, fEMG measures were
collected. Next, participants were asked to rate the intensity of the expression on a
scale of 1 (not at all intense) to 7 (extremely intense) using the number pad on
their keyboard. Participants then viewed, imitated, and evaluated 10 faces prior to
completing a post-test Affect Grid measure and beginning a new block of BIAS
trials. The emotion depicted by the 10 expressions corresponded with the facial
posing condition that they were currently in. For the happy condition, participants
were only presented with happy faces. For the fear condition, participants were
only presented with fearful faces. For the neutral condition, participants were
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presented with neutral facial expressions. Each set of ten photographs consisted of
five male and five female younger adult models presented in a random order. The
same models were used to display each of the three facial expressions.
Stimuli. The facial stimuli were taken from the FACES database, which
contains 2,052 photos of younger and older adult emotional facial expressions
(Ebner et al., 2010). The photos were created by photographing models as they
posed prototypic emotional expressions. The validity of the expressions was
examined with the use of the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) in order to
make sure that the modeled expressions matched the prototypic expression
configurations (Ekman & Friesen, 1977).
Physiological measures and apparatus. Two relatively unobtrusive
physiological measures, fEMG and electrodermal activity (EDA), were collected.
These measures served as objective measures of affective responses during the
emotion induction portion of the task. Both facial and electrodermal activity was
recorded at a sampling rate of 1 kHz with an integrated wireless system and
software package (Biopac MP150, AcqKnowledge; Biopac Systems, Goleta, CA).
Facial electromyography (fEMG). fEMG activity served as an objective
measure of participants’ facial responses (Larsen et al., 2003) during the ten
seconds prior to and after the initial presentation of the emotional faces in the
emotion induction task. EMG was measured on the corrugator and zygomaticus
muscle sites. Pairs of 4 mm Ag/AgCl electrodes were attached to the zygomaticus
major and corrugator supercillii muscles following the guidelines set forth by
Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). The raw fEMG waveforms were first high-pass (at
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400hz), low-pass (at 28hz), and notch filtered (at 60hz to reduce electrical noise)
and then rectified (transformed into positive numbers), and smoothed with a
moving average window of 50ms.
Next, corrugator and zygomaticus muscle activity was processed into
scores for the analyses. First, to correct outliers, the data was “winsorized” within
each participant (Tukey, 1977). Each participant’s facial activity during the facial
posing trial was then divided into twenty 1000ms windows (ten for the baseline
period prior to the trial and ten during the trial itself). Windows with absolute
values that were higher than three standard deviations from the mean of a
participant’s collective muscle activity were replaced with values representing
three standard deviations from the mean for that participants’ muscle activity. In
order to calculate a score representing the change in muscle activity from the
baseline, fEMG activity in each 1000ms window during the posing trial was
converted into a z-score using the mean and standard deviation of the facial
muscle activity during all of that subject’s baseline periods. Facial activity zscores across the 1000ms windows were then averaged into one score for each of
the blocks. A positive score indicated that there was more activity during the
posing trial than the average activity across all of the baseline periods.
Electrodermal activity. EDA activity was indicative of autonomic nervous
system activation during the entire task. Such activations are often viewed as
correlates of affective arousal (Cacioppo, Berntson, Larsen, Poehlmann, & Ito,
2000; Bechara et al., 1994; Lo & Repin, 2002) and can occur in response to
emotional stressors (e.g., fear stimuli; Stern, Ray, & Quigley, 2001). Although
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physiological arousal was not central to the goals or scope of this present study,
measures of EDA responses while participants completed the bias task were
collected for exploratory purposes.
Procedure
After participants’ signing of the consent form, fEMG sensors were
attached to the zygomaticus major and corrugator supercilii muscle sites. Next,
EDA electrodes were attached to the anterior tips of the phalanges of the middle
and ring fingers on participants’ non-dominant hand. After sensor calibration,
participants began a five-minute rest period during which they relaxed and
acclimated to the sensors. Next, participants completed the modified BIAS task
and were informed that they would keep a proportion of their winnings (in order
to make the task more personally relevant). After the task, participants completed
a measure of numeracy and a basic demographics questionnaire. The sensors were
then removed and participants were paid $1 regardless of their performance.
Analyses and Results
A total of 36 participants were included in the analyses (see sample
section above for exclusion criteria). A manipulation check was first conducted in
order to examine the influence of the facial posing task on participants’ facial
activity and self-reported affect. Next, the hypotheses were examined using multi
level regressions.
Manipulation Check
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Prior to testing the main hypotheses, it was important to examine whether
the facial posing manipulation had the intended effect on participants’ fEMG
activity and self-reported affect.
First, separate one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA’s) were conducted
in order to determine if there was a difference in corrugator and zygomaticus
activity across the three facial posing conditions. A main effect of condition was
found for both corrugator (F(2, 321) = 123.37, p <.001, ηp2 =.435) and
zygomaticus activity (F(2, 321) = 400.85, p < .001 . ηp2 =.714).
Follow-up pairwise comparisons indicated that participants had
significantly higher corrugator activity in the fear (M = 4.00, SD = 3.65) relative
to the happy (M = -.34, SD = .60, t(215) = 14.64 , p < .001 ) and neutral (M = .38,
SD = .73, t(215) = 12.25, p < .001 ) posing conditions. Furthermore, corrugator
activity in the neutral condition (M = .38, SD = .73) was significantly higher
relative to the happy condition (M = -.34, SD = .60, t(215) = 2.39 , p = .018 ).
For zygomaticus activity, pairwise comparisons indicated that participants
had significantly higher zygomaticus activity in the happy (M = 2.02, SD = .91)
relative to the fear (M = .34, SD = .45, t(215) = 20.76, p < .001) and neutral
posing conditions (M = -.18, SD = .18, t(215) = 27.05, p < .001). Furthermore,
zygomaticus activity in the fear condition (M = .34, SD = .45) was significantly
higher relative to the neutral condition (M = -.18, SD = .18, t(215) = 6.29, p <
.001).
Next, a one-way ANOVA was conducted in order to assess whether the
posing conditions successfully manipulated self-reported changes in valence. A
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main effect of condition was found for changes in valence (F(2, 321) = 3.28, p =
.039, ηp2 = .020). Follow-up pairwise comparisons indicated that participants had
a significantly greater reduction in valence (i.e., greater negative valence) after the
posing trials in the neutral condition (M = -.47, SD = 1.24) relative to those in
both the fear (M = -.07, SD = 1.43, t(215) = -2.06, p < .001) and happy (M = -.02,
SD =1.56, t(215) = -2.35, p < .001 ) conditions. Changes in valence were not
significantly different between the happy (M = -.02, SD =1.56) and fearful
conditions (M = -.07, SD = 1.43, t(215) = .29, p = .774).
Tests of Main Hypotheses
To determine the percentage of sub-optimal choices made, participants’
choices were compared to a rational investment strategy model used in previous
BIAS task research (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005). The model uses the feedback
from each stock’s earnings and losses in previous trials (within the same block) to
calculate the expected value of each stock and thus determine the optimal choice
for every decision trial. Choices that deviated from the rational strategy model
were counted as sub-optimal mistakes in one of three ways. Risk-taking mistakes
were scored when participants selected a stock rather than a bond when it was still
unclear which stock was optimal. Risk-averse mistakes were scored when
participants selected a bond when it should have been clear that one of the stocks
was optimal. Lastly, confusion mistakes were scored when participants selected
one stock when it was clear that the other one was the optimal choice. Although
no predictions regarding confusion mistakes were made, these mistakes are
examined in the analyses for exploratory purposes. These scores were averaged
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across each block into scores representing the percentage of each type of mistake
made in each block of 10 trials. These percentages served as the outcome
variables in the following analyses.
To test Hypotheses I and II, multi-level regressions were conducted in
order to examine whether participants made significantly different percentages of
sub-optimal decisions across the three facial posing conditions. Additionally, the
analyses tested whether the participants’ self-reported affect and fEMG activity
moderated the effect of the emotion expression condition on the percentage of
each type of sub-optimal mistake. Multi-level regressions (fit using restricted
maximum likelihood) were used because the data has a multi-level structure, i.e.,
the blocks were nested within subjects. Multi-level analyses such as these have
notable advantages over repeated measures ANOVAs. Namely, the unit of
analysis in these multi-level regressions is the block itself, rather than the
individual (as it would be with a traditional ANOVA). Therefore, this analysis
controls for the non-independence among the repeated observations across each
block and each individual.
Three step regressions were run for each of the three sub-optimal decision
scores, which served as dependent variables. The first step of each regression
included the covariates of numeracy (in order to control for participants’ ability to
work with quantitative information) and a variable representing the order of the
blocks (in order to control for improved decision making as the blocks
progressed). The second step included the factor representing the main effect of
the facial posing condition in order to test HI. The variable representing the
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posing condition was dummy coded so that the neutral condition would serve as
the referent group. Lastly, the third step tested HII by including the factors
representing the three continuous affect variables (self-reported valence,
corrugator activity, or zygomaticus activity) and the interactions between the
affect variables and condition. Follow-up post-hoc analyses were used to examine
if the percentages of sub-optimal mistakes differed across each pair of conditions.
Significant interactions in the third step were examined by computing simple
slopes. See Tables 1, 2, and 3 for detailed effects of the predictors at each step of
the regressions for risk-seeking, risk-averse, and confusion mistakes.
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Table 1.
Risk-Seeking Mistakes as a Function of the Covariates, Facial Posing Condition, and Affective Responding Variables
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
b
SE
t
b
SE
t
b
SE
t
Intercept
20.24*
8.60
2.35
20.28*
8.66
2.34
25.21*
9.28
2.71
Block order
-0.64*
0.29 -2.18
-0.64
0.30 -2.17
-0.60*
0.30
-1.97
Numeracy
1.98
11.74
0.17
1.98
11.74
0.17
4.12
12.46
0.33
Fear vs. Neutral Condition
Happy vs. Neutral Condition

-8.44*
-7.83

-8.44
-7.83

3.34
4.38

Valence Ratings
Corrugator Activity
Zygomaticus Activity

1.26
-3.92*
26.27**

1.21
2.04
8.55

1.04
-1.92
3.07

Fear vs. Neutral * Valence
Happy vs. Neutral * Valence
Fear vs. Neutral * Corr
Happy vs. Neutral * Corr
Fear vs. Neutral * Zyg
Happy vs. Neutral * Zyg

-0.79
-0.75
4.40*
4.76
-26.67**
-25.59**

1.56
1.42
2.08
3.25
9.58
8.76

-0.51
-0.53
2.12
1.46
-2.78
-2.92

Wald χ²

-0.02
-0.09

.900, p = .630

1.79
1.79

-0.01
-0.05

4.75, p = .314

Note. Values are the MLM unstandardized b coefficients (SE in parentheses). *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

19.82, p = .099
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Table 2.
Risk-Averse Mistakes as a Function of the Covariates, Facial Posing Condition, and Affective Responding Variables
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
b
SE
t
b
SE
t
b
SE
t
32.80*
Intercept
31.19*
9.78 3.19
9.82
3.34
33.54*
10.30
3.26
Block order
0.23
0.29 0.81
0.26*
0.29
0.91
0.38
0.30
1.29
Numeracy
-6.58
-6.58
13.40 -0.49
13.40 -0.49
-8.71
13.91 -0.63
Fear vs. Neutral Condition
Happy vs. Neutral Condition

-3.86*
-1.39

-5.19
5.88

3.30
4.33

-1.57
1.36

Valence Ratings
Corrugator
Zygomaticus

-0.28
-0.16
-0.43

1.20
2.02
8.45

-0.23
-0.08
-0.05

Fear vs. Neutral *Valence
Happy vs. Neutral *Valence
Fear vs. Neutral *Corr
Happy vs. Neutral * Corr
Fear vs. Neutral * Zyg
Happy vs. Neutral * Zyg

-1.98
-0.25
0.64
4.89
-1.49
-2.30

1.54
1.40
2.05
3.22
9.50
8.67

-1.28
-0.18
0.31
1.52
-0.16
-0.27

Wald χ²

.900, p = .639

1.73
1.73

-2.23
-0.80

6.00, p = .199

Note. Values are the MLM unstandardized b coefficients (SE in parentheses). *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

17.45, p = .180
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Table 3.
Confusion Mistakes as a Function of the Covariates, Facial Posing Condition, and Affective Responding Variables
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
b
SE
t
b
SE
t
b
SE
t
Intercept
8.15
5.27 1.55
6.98
5.32
1.31
6.70*
5.62
1.19
Block order
-0.74**
0.20 -3.62
-0.64*
0.30 -2.17
-0.64*
0.21
-3.09
Numeracy
2.98
7.16 0.42
1.98
11.74
0.17
4.13
7.47
0.55
Fear vs. Neutral
Happy vs. Neutral

-8.44
-7.83

3.34
4.38

-2.53
-1.79

Valence Ratings
Corrugator
Zygomaticus

-0.46
2.02
11.65*

0.81
1.38
5.87

-0.57
1.47
1.99

Fear vs. Neutral * Valence
Happy vs. Neutral * Valence
Fear vs. Neutral * Corr
Happy vs. Neutral * Corr
Fear vs. Neutral * Zyg
Happy vs. Neutral * Zyg

0.21
0.71
-2.52
-5.43*
-14.59*
-12.91*

1.06
0.97
1.40
2.22
6.55
6.01

0.20
0.73
-1.80
-2.45
-2.23
-2.15

Wald χ²

-0.02
-0.09

13.25, p = .001

1.79
1.79

16.58, p = .002

-0.01
-0.05

31.90, p = .003

Note. Values are the MLM unstandardized b coefficients (SE in parentheses). *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Step 1: Numeracy and block order on sub-optimal decision making.
The first step of each regression examined the influence of the covariates, block
order, and numeracy, on sub-optimal decision making (see step 1 statistics in
tables 1, 2, and 3). Controlling for the order in which the blocks were presented,
numeracy had no effect on any type of sub-optimal decision. Regarding the
influence of the order variable, subjects made fewer risk-seeking mistakes (b = .64, t(105) = -2.18, p = .03) and confusion mistakes (b = -.74, t(105) = -3.62, p <
.001) as blocks progressed. No significant effects of block order or numeracy for
risk-averse mistakes were found and are therefore not described.
Step 2: Main effects of facial posing condition on sub-optimal decision
making. The second step in each regression included the main effect of facial
posing condition with the neutral condition dummy coded as the referent. Thus,
the unstandardized betas reported for the fear and happy conditions represent the
changes in the slopes relative to the neutral condition. Table 4 reports the mean
percentage of each sub-optimal mistake for each condition. As indicated in step 2
of Table 2,and confirmed using pair-wise comparisons, the percentage of risk
averse mistakes was lower in the fear-posing condition relative to the neutral
condition (b = -3.86, t(104) = -2.23, p = .03). The percentage of risk-seeking
mistakes and confusion mistakes did not vary across conditions. As for the
covariates, subjects made fewer risk-seeking mistakes (b = -.64, t(104) = -2.17, p
= .03) and confusion mistakes (b = -.75, t(104) = -3.69, p < .001) as the order of
the trials progressed. Numeracy had no effect on sub-optimal decision making
(see step 2 of Tables 1, 2, and 3).
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Table 4.
Average Percent of Sub-Optimal Decisions by Condition
_________________________________________________
Risk-Seeking Risk-Averse Confusion
Mean (SD)
Mean (SD)
Mean (SD)
_________________________________________________
Condition
Fear

18.33
(20.07)

25.65
(22.72)

7.41
(13.42)

Happy

18.43
(21.62)

28.06
(23.30)

6.85
(11.97)

Neutral 18.52
29.44
5.37
(22.12)
(23.36)
(9.61)
_________________________________________________
Step 3: Main effects of affective responding (self-reported valence and
fEMG) and interactions between affective responding and facial posing
condition on sub-optimal decision making. The third step in each regression
tested HII by assessing how sub-optimal decisions were influenced by the
interactions among the fEMG variables and condition as well as by the interaction
between the degree of self reported valence change and condition. The following
sections detail the results of the regressions for risk-seeking and confusion
mistakes. No significant main effects or interactions were observed for risk-averse
mistakes and are therefore not described (see step 3 of Tables 1, 2, and 3).
Risk-seeking mistakes. As in previous steps of the regression for this
outcome variable, the significant effect of the order variable indicates that there
were lower percentages of risk-seeking mistakes as the blocks progressed (b = .06, t(100) = -1.97, p = .05). Significant main effects for the fear vs. neutral
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condition and both of the fEMG variables were found in the third step of the riskseeking regression; however these main effects were not interpretable given the
presence of significant interactions between the fear vs. neutral condition and
zygomatic EMG activity variables (see Table 1).
There was no significant interaction between valence-ratings change
scores and facial posing condition. Significant interactions between the fear vs.
neutral condition variable and both fEMG variables were found. In addition the
results indicated a significant interaction between the happy vs. neutral condition
and zygomaticus activity. Specifically, the slopes demonstrating the relationship
between corrugator activity and risk-seeking mistakes were different between the
fear and neutral conditions (b = 4.40, t(100) = 2.12, p = .034). The slopes
demonstrating the relationship between zygomaticus activity and risk-seeking
mistakes in the fear (b = -26.67, t(100) = -2.78, p = .005) and happy (b = -25.59,
t(100) = -2.92, p = .003) conditions were both different from the slopes in the
neutral condition.
Follow-up examinations of simple slopes were conducted to examine how
the influence of both fEMG variables on risk-seeking mistakes differed across
emotion induction conditions. No effects of EMG activity were found for either
the fear or happy conditions. In the neutral condition blocks, the percentage of
risk-seeking mistakes was negatively related to corrugator activity (b = -3.92,
t(100) = 2.04, p = .050) and positively related to zygomaticus activity (b = 26.27,
t(100) = 3.07, p = .002). Thus, decreased corrugator activation and increased
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zygomaticus activation related to increased percentages of risk-seeking mistakes
in the neutral condition.
Confusion mistakes. A significant effect of the order variable was found,
indicating that there were lower percentages of confusion mistakes as the blocks
progressed (b = -.64, t(100) = -3.09, p = .002). A significant main effect of
zygomaticus activity was found in the third step of this regression, yet this main
effect was qualified by a significant interaction between condition and
zygomaticus activity (thus rendering the main effect uninterpretable).
There was no significant interaction between valence-change and
condition. Significant two-way interactions among the condition variable and both
EMG variables were found. Specifically, the slopes representing the relationship
between corrugator activity and confusion mistakes were different in the happy
relative to the neutral condition (b = -5.43, t(100) = 2.22, p = .014). The slopes
demonstrating the relationship between zygomaticus activity and confusion
mistakes in the fear (b = -14.59, t(100) = -2.23, p = .026) and happy (b = -12.91,
t(100) = -2.15, p = .032) conditions were both different from the slopes in the
neutral condition.
Follow-up examinations of simple slopes were conducted to determine
how the influence of both fEMG variables on confusion mistakes differed across
emotion induction conditions. In the neutral condition blocks, the percentage of
confusion mistakes was positively related to zygomaticus activity (b = 11.65,
t(100) = 5.87, p = .047 ). Thus, increased zygomaticus activation (in response to
the faces prior to decisions) in the neutral blocks related to increased percentages
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of confusion mistakes. For blocks within the happy condition, increased
corrugator activity was related to decreased confusion mistakes (b = -3.41, t(100)
= -2.00, p = .046).
Additional Analyses
Given the unexpected relationship between fEMG activity and riskseeking behavior in the neutral and happy conditions, correlations were conducted
in order to examine if facial responding was related to changes in valence (as
measured by the Affect Grid) separately for each condition. In all conditions, selfreported changes in valence was not significantly correlated to either corrugator
or zygomaticus activity (all p’s >.05)
Discussion
The current investigation aimed to examine how a facial posing
manipulation of incidental affect influenced the percentage of sub-optimal
decision-making errors in an investment task. Furthermore, an additional aim was
to examine if the extent to which participants were influenced by the manipulation
(in terms of their facial muscle activity and self-reported affective valence)
impacted their risk-related decisions differently across conditions.
Influence of facial posing condition on fEMG activity
On average, participants successfully followed the instructions in the
facial posing task. Specifically, greater corrugator activity was present in the fear
relative to the happy and neutral conditions and greater zygomaticus activity was
present in the happy relative to the fearful and neutral conditions.
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Influence of Facial Posing Condition on Changes in Self-Reported Valence
The manipulation check indicated that the facial posing manipulation did
not have the intended effects on participants’ changes in self-reported valence.
Contrary to expectations, participants in all conditions reported some degree of
increased negative valence from before to after the facial posing tasks. The
greatest increase in negative valence was in the neutral condition. These findings
indicate that the posing task was, to some extent, unpleasant overall and
especially unpleasant in the neutral condition. Potentially, participants felt more
negative valence after the neutral condition due to a lower level of engagement
(or increased boredom from posing and evaluating the neutral stimuli).
Influence of Facial Posing Condition on Risk-Related Decision Making
Hypothesis 1 proposed that participants would be make more risk averse
mistakes in the negative affect (fear-posing) condition relative to the neutral and
positive affect (happy-posing) conditions. Participants were predicted to make
more risk-seeking mistakes in the positive affect (happy-posing) relative to the
negative affect (fear-posing) and neutral-posing conditions. The results do not
support these predictions. The percentages of risk-seeking choices were not
significantly different across the facial posing conditions. Further contrary to the
predictions, participants demonstrated more sub-optimal risk aversion in the
neutral condition relative to the negative affect (fear-posing) condition. These
results are indeed inconsistent with previous findings regarding the influence of
facial expressions on decision making. Importantly, though, the manipulation
check analyses revealed that relative to the other conditions, participants
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experienced significantly greater increases in negative affect in the neutral
condition. Given that negative affect is related to increased risk aversion mistakes,
it is not surprising that participants made greater percentages of risk-averse
mistakes in the neutral condition.
Moderating Influence of Facial Muscle Activity and Valence Change on
Risk-related Decision Making Across Facial Posing Conditions
The second hypothesis proposed that the degree to which participants were
influenced by the facial posing manipulation would moderate the influence of
condition on decision making. The influence of the manipulation was measured in
two different ways: (1) by assessing the degree to which participants activated
their corrugator and zygomaticus muscles during the facial posing task, and (2)
by assessing the degree to which their self-reported valence changed from before
to after the task. It was specifically predicted that participants who responded to
the positive emotion induction procedure with a greater (versus lesser) change in
positive valence (either measured via the Affect Grid or zygomaticus activity)
would make more risk-taking mistakes and fewer risk-averse mistakes.
Furthermore, participants who responded to the negative emotion induction
procedure with a greater (versus lesser) change in negative valence (measured via
the Affect Grid and corrugator activity) were predicted to make fewer risk-taking
mistakes and more risk-averse mistakes.
Overall, there was no support for the predictions regarding the moderating
influence of the affective responding variables on the relationship between the
posing condition and sub-optimal decision making. First, no interactions between
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the facial posing condition and self-reported changes in valence were found. This
indicated that the extent to which participants’ self reported affect predicted suboptimal decision making did not differ across conditions. The significant
interactions between the posing condition variable and fEMG variables indicate
that the influence of facial activity on risk-seeking mistakes and confusion
mistakes did differ across conditions. Unfortunately, the pattern of results did not
support the hypotheses. It is possible that this lack of support for the predictions
was due to the unsuccessful manipulation of incidental affect. The following
sections discuss the interactions among condition and facial activity on riskseeking and confusion mistakes in detail.
Risk-seeking mistakes. As stated above, risk-seeking mistakes occurred
when participants selected a risky option when it was not yet clear if a stock had a
greater expected value than the bond. No relations among EMG activity and riskseeking mistakes were found for either the fear or happy conditions. Although
participants in the neutral condition were instructed to pose neutral facial
expressions, variability in corrugator and zygomaticus responding to the neutral
expressions was related to the percentage of risk-seeking mistakes. Specifically,
in the neutral condition blocks, decreased corrugator activation and increased
zygomaticus activation (in response to the faces in the neutral blocks) resulted in
increased percentages of risk-seeking mistakes. Indeed, this pattern of results was
not predicted. Nonetheless, previous research suggests that if the pattern of facial
responding to the neutral stimuli was a manifestation or correlate of affective
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experience, then the associations between facial responding and risk seeking in
the neutral condition should have been expected.
Based on previous research, corrugator responding is related with higher
levels of experienced negative affect (Larsen, et al., 2003), and negative affect is
related to less risk-seeking behavior (e.g., Habib et al., 2015; Yuen & Lee, 2003).
Conversely, zygomaticus responding is known to relate to increased experience of
positive affect (Larsen, et al., 2003), which other research has found to predict
increased risk-seeking behavior (e.g., Chou et al., 2007). Unfortunately, such an
explanation cannot be supported by the current data given that neither corrugator
nor zygomaticus activity were correlated with self-reported changes in valence in
the neutral condition. On the other hand, it is possible that the variability in
corrugator and zygomaticus activity in response to neutral stimuli reflected
unconscious affective experiences that participants were not aware of and thus
unable to report on the Affect Grid. If this were the case, then the general
relationship between facial responding and risk seeking in the neutral condition is
in line with the research mentioned above.
An alternate explanation is that participants’ facial responses to the neutral
stimuli reflected an interpretive or evaluative bias that carried over to the decision
task. Previous work has linked corrugator responding to a negativity bias in the
evaluation of affectively ambiguous facial stimuli (Neta, Norris, & Whalen,
2009). The neutral expressions in the present study were also ambiguous in
valence, thus the pattern of facial responses during the neutral posing task may
have reflected a similar interpretive bias. For instance, increased corrugator
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activity in the neutral posing condition could have indicated that a participant was
evaluating the neutral face more negatively.
If this were the case, then it is possible that such interpretive biases could
have also extended to evaluations of the stocks and bonds. For instance, if a
participant evaluated the neutral faces more negatively, it is possible that they also
evaluated the ambiguous stocks more negatively and thus avoided them.
Alternately, if a participant evaluated the neutral faces more positively (as could
be indicated by increased zygomaticus activity) then they could have also
evaluated the subsequent ambiguous stocks to be more positive and thus were
more sub-optimally risk seeking.
The presence of interactions for risk-seeking mistakes and not for riskaverse mistakes indicates that facial responses in the neutral condition were
related to a propensity to incorrectly select risky options over optimal safe options
and not the propensity to incorrectly choose safe options over more optimal risky
options. Again following the reason above, which suggests that facial responses
can represent evaluations of ambiguous stimuli, it can be suggested that facial
responding would not predict the selection of a non-ambiguous bond. The bond
was unambiguous in that it had the same rate of return for every trial ($1).
Confusion mistakes. These types of mistakes occurred when participants
selected a sub-optimal stock rather than an optimal one. Although no specific
predictions regarding the interaction of condition and facial activity were made
for confusion mistakes, an interesting pattern of results emerged. Specifically,
increased zygomaticus activation in the neutral blocks was related to an increased
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percentage of confusion mistakes. This suggests that positive affect (as suggested
by increased zygomaticus activity) may be related to more haphazard and less
optimal risk-taking in the current investment paradigm. As mentioned above in
the previous section, the current data cannot support this explanation, as valence
change was not correlated to fEMG activity in any condition. Alternately, a
similar explanation can be made for this finding as was provided earlier for the
relation between zygomaticus activity and risk-seeking mistakes in the neutral
condition. That is, increased zygomaticus activity in response to the neutral
stimuli can reflect an overall interpretive bias that would relate to more positive
evaluations of ambiguous risky stock options.
Furthermore, in the happy condition, increased corrugator activity was
related to decreased confusion mistakes. These results can be taken to suggest that
negative affective facial responding in the happy condition was related to a lower
likelihood of selecting sub-optimal risky stocks. Although as previously
mentioned in this discussion, such an explanation is not supported by the current
data given the lack of correlation between valence change and fEMG activity in
the happy condition.
Limitations and Future Directions
It is possible that the lack of support for the predictions regarding the
influence of the facial posing condition on decision making was due to the
unsuccessful manipulation of incidental affect across all conditions. Future
research may opt for a task requiring participants to passively view facial
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expression rather than pose them as such a task has been successful in altering
risk-seeking behavior in previous research (Habib et al., 2015).
Furthermore, the facial posing task may have been too explicit of a
manipulation and lacked some degree of ecological validity. For instance,
individuals are never required to imitate facial expressions prior to making risky
decisions in real-world settings. Future research examining the role of (incidental)
affective stimuli on risk-related behavior should strive to integrate the affective
stimuli with the decision targets in a more cohesive manner. For example, this
could be achieved by manipulating the facial expressions of individuals in
commercials then asking viewers to evaluate the risks of the product being
advertised. Lastly, future research may consider utilizing an independent groups
design rather than a repeated measures design as such a design would control for
carry-over effects of the emotion conditions to a better extent than by merely
counterbalancing the order of conditions in a repeated measures design.
Conclusion
Although the main predictions regarding the influence of the facial posing
manipulation on risk-related decision making were not supported, significant
relations between risk-seeking mistakes and fEMG activity were found in the
neutral condition. These findings suggest that increased corrugator responses to
neutral facial expressions may predict reduced risk seeking, whereas increased
zygomaticus activity in response to the same stimuli may predict increased risk
seeking. These findings begin to shed light on how one’s fEMG responses to
facial stimuli can predict risk-related decision making. More research is still
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needed to determine whether the pattern of results in the present study can be
explained by changes in affective experiences or by interpretive biases that carry
over onto the decision scenario.

52
Rationale for Study 2:
The Role of Incidental Affect in Risk Perception, Feelings, and Behavioral
Intentions toward the Flu Vaccine in Older and Younger Adults
Extending from the previous study’s examination of the influence that
incidental affect has on financial risk taking, Study 2 will examine how incidental
affect can change risk perceptions, affective judgments, and behavioral intentions
toward flu vaccinations for younger and older adults. Given that the flu is
preventable with the use of vaccines (Nichol et al., 1995), it is important to
address barriers to vaccination that may contribute to the less than ideal rates of
vaccination for younger and older adults (Nichol, Margolis, Wuorenma, Von
Sternberg, 1994). One common barrier to vaccination practices for older and
younger adults is the perceived risk related to vaccines (Bartels, Kelly, &
Rothman, 2007; Betsch, Ulshöfer, Renkewitz & Betsch, 2011; Ferguson &
Gallagher, 2007; Zimmerman et al., 2003).
Although previous research has effectively changed treatment-related
feelings and risk perceptions through the use of message-frame manipulations
(e.g., McCaul, Johnson, & Rothman, 2002; Rothman, Salovey, Antone, Keough,
& Martin, 1993), researchers have largely ignored more social media through
which consumers and patients receive much of their health information. The
present study attempted to change risk perceptions, feelings, and intentions
regarding the flu vaccine by inducing incidental affect through the use of an
affective framing manipulation. The manipulation required participants to watch
an informational commercial about the flu vaccine. Based on the previously
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discussed influences of positive and negative valence on judgments and decisions
involving risk, the commercial depicted doctors who were either displaying facial
expressions representing positive affect (smiling) or negative affect (furrowing
their brow in concern). Brow furrowing was achieved by activating the
corrugator muscle. The corrugator was the only muscle that is activated in the
display of all negative emotional facial expressions and is not a component of any
emotionally positive expression (Ekman & Friesen, 1975).
Based on the research described above, emotional facial expressions
accompanying medical information in commercials were predicted to modulate
the influence of the health messages. Specifically, affect elicited from emotional
expressions accompanying health massages was expected to influence risk and
benefit perceptions, and shape intentions to vaccinate. Additionally, given the
age-related shift toward a preference for positive over negative information, the
positive and negative emotional stimuli were predicted to have differential effects
for older and younger adults (Carstensen & Mikels, 2005; Chou et al., 2007).
As previously described, early research conducted outside of the medical
domain supports the association between induced incidental affect and risk
perception. Specifically, incidental positive affect leads to higher subjective
probabilities of positive outcomes and negative affect leads to higher subjective
probabilities of negative outcomes (e.g., Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Wright &
Bower, 1992). In the domain of vaccines, a positive outcome would involve the
vaccine working and resulting in no undesired side effects, whereas a negative
outcome would involve the vaccine not working and/or causing unwanted side
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effects. Examining the influence of incidental affect on treatment evaluations for
older and younger adults requires a consideration of age differences in healthrelated risk perception, vaccine utilization, and most importantly, emotional
processes that are relevant for risk-related decision making.
Research examining age-differences in risk perception across multiple
domains found that compared to the young, older adults were less likely to take
risks that could aversely affect their health (Rolison, Hanoch, Wood, & Liu,
2013). Thus, it may be no surprise that older adults receive influenza vaccinations
at higher rates than their younger counterparts in order to reduce their risk of
contracting the flu (Bish, Yardley, Nicoll, & Michie, 2001; Galvani, Reluga, &
Chapman, 2007). Unfortunately, few psychological studies have examined risk
perceptions related to the flu or the flu vaccine among older and younger adults.
Given the higher rates of vaccine utilization among older adults, it is unclear
whether they perceive the flu to be riskier or whether they perceive the flu vaccine
to be less risky than it is beneficial. Either way, the findings regarding age
differences in vaccine utilization stress the importance of controlling for previous
vaccine usage in any analyses comparing the effects of affective manipulations on
risk perceptions.
Moving onto age related changes in affective processes, relative to the
young, older adults report higher levels of positive state affect and lower levels of
negative state affect (Carstensen et al., 2011). Such affective changes may lead
older adults to focus less on information pertaining to the potential for
unfavorable outcomes and thus perceive lower levels of risk. In addition to age-
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related changes in the everyday experience of emotion, an age-related preference
for positive over negative information, “the positivity effect,” has been observed
in numerous studies examining processes ranging from attention and memory to
decision making (for reviews see Carstensen & Mikels, 2005; Reed, Chan, &
Mikels, 2014). For example, with the use of eye-tracking methodologies, older
adults (relative to younger adults) demonstrated an increased attentional
preference towards positive stimuli and away from negative stimuli (Isaacowitz,
Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006). Compared to younger adults, older adults
also attend to and recall more positive compared to negative information in
decision tasks (Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2007; Mather, Knight, & McCaffrey,
2005).
Considering the affect as information and affect heuristic models
described above, the positivity effect could lead older adults to accept possible
risks related to vaccination itself (e.g., side effects and potential complications)
due to a reduced focus on negative information in favor of positive information
(e.g., the probability of preventing the contraction of influenza). Moreover, it is
important to consider research indicating that older adults are impacted by
emotion induction procedures differently than are younger adults (Chou et al.,
2007; Larcom & Isaacowitz, 2009). For instance, relative to younger adults, older
adults reported more positive moods after positive emotion inductions and less
negative moods after negative emotion induction (Chou et al., 2007). Based on
these findings, the emotional facial stimuli present in the flu commercials was
predicted to differentially impact older and younger adults.
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Present Study
The present study utilized fEMG to measure facial responses to an
incidental affect manipulation consisting of a commercial of doctors posing either
positive (smiling) or negative (concerned brow furrowing) facial expressions
while a recorded audio message presented a mixed-frame health message
regarding influenza and vaccination. The goal of this manipulation was to change
participant’s evaluations of the flu and the flu vaccine. Specifically, the smilingdoctor commercial was predicted to make participants evaluate the vaccine as
more beneficial and less risky in comparison to the concerned-doctor commercial.
In conjunction with self-reported affect and discrete emotion measures, the fEMG
measures allowed for the examination of whether affective responses to the
commercials moderated the effect of the affect manipulation on changes in
evaluations related to the flu and vaccinations. To be clear, it was not explicitly
predicted that either physiologically measured or self-reported affect would fully
explain, or in other words fully mediate, the relationship between the condition
and changes in evaluations toward the vaccination. Rather, it was hypothesized
that greater changes in self-reported feelings and/or affective facial activity,
which correspond to the valence of the commercial condition, would yield greater
changes in vaccine-related evaluations.
Regarding age effects, research indicates that older adults are impacted by
emotion induction procedures differently than are younger adults (Chou et al.,
2007). Thus, an age by condition interaction was predicted in which older (versus
younger) adults would have more positive attitude change toward the flu vaccine
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in the positive condition and less negative attitude change toward the vaccine in
the negative condition. Evidence suggests that older and younger adults show
similar patterns of facial mimicry (Bailey, Henry, & Nangle, 2009), thus the
relationship between facial responses and attitude change could be compared
between older and younger adults.
Hypothesis I: There would be a main effect of condition on participants’ changes
in affective states. Affective states were measured by fEMG responses to the
stimuli, as well as by changes in self-reported valence, arousal, and discrete
emotions from before to after the commercial stimuli. Participants in the smilingdoctor condition were expected to report more positive change in valence and
positive discrete emotions (joy and amusement) and less negative change in
valence and discrete negative emotions (fear and sadness) compared to those in
the concerned-doctor condition. No predictions were made regarding the
influence of the facial expression manipulation on changes in self-reported
measures of arousal. For the fEMG measures of affective responding, it was
predicted that the smiling-doctor condition would elicit more zygomaticus activity
and less corrugator activity than the concerned-doctor condition.
Hypothesis II: There would be an interaction between participants’ age-group
and expression condition on participants’ changes in affective states. Compared to
younger adults, older adults were expected report more positive change in valence
and positive discrete emotions in the smiling-doctor condition and were expected
to report less negative change in valence and negative discrete emotions in the
concerned-doctor condition. This was based on findings from Chou et al. (2007),
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and Larcom and Issacowitz (2009), which indicate that older and younger adults
respond differently to emotion inductions.
Hypothesis III: There would be a main effect of condition on changes in
evaluations of the flu and the flu vaccine. Changes in flu and flu vaccine
evaluations were assessed by the differences between the pre and post measures
of participants’ self-reported feelings, risk and benefit evaluations, and behavioral
intentions. Each of the following hypotheses predicted relationships among
variables that would occur after the following covariates were controlled for:
experience with the flu, initial procedural risk perception (likelihood of side
effects) and initial integral feelings toward the flu (worry) all taken from the pretest measures.
III(a): In regards to feelings toward the flu itself, compared to those in the
positive smile condition, participants in the negative concerned-doctor condition
were expected to report a greater increase in how worried they were about getting
the flu.
III(b): Regarding evaluations of the vaccination, participants in the smile
condition were expected to feel that the vaccine would be more beneficial (reduce
their perceived chances of getting the flu) and less risky (lower their perceived
chance of experiencing negative side effects).
III(c): Participants in the smiling-doctor condition were expected to report
more positive feelings toward the vaccine itself in comparison to those in the
concerned-doctor condition.
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III(d): Lastly, participants in the smile versus concerned-doctor condition were
expected to report a greater increase in their likelihood of getting the flu vaccine
in the next coming flu season, recommending the vaccine to their family and
friends, and would be willing to pay more for the flu vaccine.
Hypothesis IV: There would be an interaction between age group and condition
on changes in evaluations toward the flu and the flu vaccine. Compared to their
younger counterparts, older adults were expected to have greater positive change
in evaluations toward the flu and the flu vaccine in the smiling-doctor condition
and less negative changes in evaluations of the flu in the concerned-doctor
condition. This hypothesis was an extension from the predictions made by
Hypotheses II and III. For instance, if the older adult group felt more positively
after the smiling-doctor commercial (compared to the younger group), they
should also have a greater change in positive evaluations.
Hypothesis V: Participants’ affective responses (both self-reported and
physiologically-measured) to the commercial were expected to moderate the
effect of the condition on changes in evaluations toward the flu and flu vaccines.
Participants in the smiling-doctor condition who either reported a greater versus
lower positive change in valence, happiness, or contentment, or those who had
higher versus lower rates of zygomaticus activity in response to the commercial
would report a more positive change in evaluations toward the vaccines.
Alternately, participants in the concerned-doctor condition who either reported a
greater versus lower negative change in valence, sadness, or fear, or those who
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had higher versus lower rates of corrugator activity in response to the commercial
would report a more negative change in evaluations toward the vaccines.
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Methods
Sample
Forty older and forty younger adults were recruited for the study. Younger
adults were recruited from the SONA system subject pool and were compensated
for their time via course credit. Older adults were recruited from local senior
centers and the Buehler Center on Aging, Health, & Society (BCAHS) subject
pool made accessible to the host lab by the Feinberg School of Medicine of
Northwestern University. Older adults were compensated $30 for their
participation in a larger study, which includes this present experiment.
Measures and Stimuli
Audiovisual stimuli. To create the stimuli, videos of three actors dressed
as doctors were obtained from the image and video archive website Pond5.com.
Depending on their condition, participants either watched a video of three doctors
smiling or a video of the same doctors looking concerned. Both videos contained
three 16-second segments (one for each actor). The video segments were edited so
that the doctors in the smiling-doctor commercial only displayed zygomaticus
muscle activity (FACS AUs: 12 +/- 25) and cheek raises (AU 6) throughout the
entire duration of the segments. The concerned-doctor (negative) video segments
were edited so that the doctors only displayed corrugator activity (AU 4) (Ekman
& Friesen, 1977) throughout the entire duration of the segments. In all video
segments, the gaze of the doctors is focused on the viewer of the commercial. A
message attempting to persuade the viewer to get the flu vaccine in the next flu
season accompanied the video. The message was an audio recording read by a
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male voice actor and was created using information taken from the Centers for
Disease Control (cdc.gov, retrieved April 2014) regarding the flu and the flu
vaccine. The message included statements regarding the flu itself, the benefits of
the vaccine, and the procedural risks related to the vaccine (see Appendix). The
commercial was presented on a computer screen with the audio playing through
desktop computer speakers. The videos in both conditions were accompanied by
the same audio message.
Self-reported affect. Two measures of self-reported affect were
administered prior to and after the presentation of the commercial. The degree to
which participants’ affect changed between the pre and post measures served as a
manipulation check in addition to a moderating variable in the analysis.
The Affect Grid (Appendix A). Similar to Study 1, the Affect Grid was
used to measure valence and arousal.
The mDES (Appendix B). This measure was selected in order to assess
self-reported changes in the experience of discrete emotions from before to after
the commercial. The original mDES measure evaluates emotions experienced in
the last 24hrs (Fredrickson et al., 2003). The current study utilized a modified
version if the measure designed to measure state affect. The questionnaire
informed participants that “in any given circumstance, people often have a
number of different feelings” then instructed them to indicate the extent to which
they presently felt 19 different emotions on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4
(extremely). The present investigation only examined the discrete emotions that
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were presumed to change as a function of age group and condition; joy,
amusement, fear, and sadness.
Physiological measures of affect and apparatus. Corrugator activity,
zygomatic activity, and Electrodermal Activity (EDA) was collected during a oneminute baseline period prior to the flu commercial and during the commercial
itself. This study used same equipment and procedure to measure and process
fEMG as Study 1 with one notable difference. The waveforms containing the
facial activity were averaged into twenty, five-second windows (ten windows
during the baseline period before the presentation of the commercial and ten
windows during the presentation of the commercial). As in Study 1, EDA was
collected for exploratory purposes.
Evaluations of and experience with the flu and flu vaccinations
(Appendix C). Measures of participants’ feelings, risk/benefit evaluations, and
behavioral intentions regarding flu vaccinations were assessed prior to the
experimental session and after the commercial. The difference between the pre
and post evaluations served as the dependent variables in this study. Questions
regarding participants’ experience with the flu and the flu vaccine were
administered in order to serve as control variables in the analyses.
Feeling of worry toward the flu itself were assessed with a single item.
“How worried are you about getting the flu?” Participants responded on a seven
point, Likert-type scale that ranged from 0 (not at all worried) to 6 (extremely
worried) with 3 (moderately worried) at the midpoint.
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Feeling toward flu vaccines were assessed with a single item: “How do
you feel about the flu vaccine?” Participants responded on a seven point, bi-polar
Likert-type scale that ranged from -3 (extremely negative) to +3 (extremely
positive) with 0 (neither negative nor positive) at the midpoint.
Perceived benefits of the flu vaccine were assessed by calculating the
difference between participants’ responses on two items: “How likely are you to
get the flu if you do not get the flu vaccine” and “How likely are you to get the flu
if you do get the flu vaccine?” Participants responded to each item on an elevenpoint scale that ranged from “0% chance” to “100% chance” in 10% increments.
Each participant’s response to the second item were subtracted from their
response to the first item in order to measure how beneficial they thought the flu
vaccine was.
Perceived procedural risk of the flu vaccine was assessed with one item:
“If you do get the flu vaccine, how likely are you to experience side effects
related to the vaccine itself?” Participants responded to this item on an elevenpoint scale that ranged from “0% chance” to “100% chance” in 10% increments.
Importantly, this item was used both as a dependent measure (by subtracting the
pre from the post measure of risk) and as a covariate in tests of all hypotheses
given the previous finding that perceived risk mediates the effect of frame on
vaccination behaviors (e.g., Ferguson & Gallagher, 2007).
A Risk/benefit score was created in order to reduce the number of
outcome variables and analyses. This score was computed for each participant by
subtracting the score representing perceived vaccine-related risk from the score
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representing perceived vaccine-related benefits. Positive scores indicated the
participant perceived the vaccines to be more beneficial than risky.
Behavioral intentions regarding the flu vaccine were measured with
three questions in order to consider multiple types of intentions. The first item that
assessed intentions was: “How likely are you to get the flu vaccine in the
following flu season?” Participants responded to this item on a seven point Likerttype scale that ranged from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (extremely likely). The next
item, “How much are you willing to pay for the vaccine?” was answered on a nine
point scale that ranged from $0 to $40 in five dollar increments. The third item,
“How likely are you to recommend the flu vaccine to a friend or family member?”
was assessed on a seven point scale ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 7
(extremely likely). Participants’ responses to these items was then transformed
into z-scores and averaged into one single intention score.
Experience with the flu and the flu vaccine: Four questions were used as
covariate measures in the analyses in order prevent previous experience with the
flu from obscuring the effects of the manipulation. Furthermore, these covariates
helped to ensure that any difference found between the groups was not actually
due to group differences in flu-related experiences. “Have you had the flu in the
past year?”; “Did you get a flu vaccine this past flu season?”; and “Did a doctor
recommend that you get the vaccine?” were each responded to with either a yes or
a no. Lastly, “How often have you received the flu vaccine in the last 3 years?”
was responded to with a number ranging from zero to three. The rationale for
including these questions stems from studies which found that factors such as
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doctor recommendations and previous vaccine usage explained the majority of
variance in vaccine evaluations and acceptance (for reviews see: Chapman &
Coups, 1999, Zimmerman, Santibanez, & Fine, 2003).
Procedure
Prior to arriving at the lab session, participants completed the pre-test
questions that included all of the questions related to participant’s evaluations of
and experience with the flu and flu vaccinations. Older adult participants were
administered the pre-test questions over the phone (with some additional
questions added in order to distract from the nature of the survey), whereas
younger adults completed the questions in an online survey format (in addition to
the other questionnaires in the DePaul SONA pre-screen study).
Upon arrival to the lab session, participants first signed consent forms
prior to being fitted with the EMG and EDA sensors. The experimenter used the
same procedure described in study 1 to attach the sensors to participants.
Participants were then instructed by the researcher to attend to the
computer screen for instructions. The participants were first instructed to relax for
a fine minute period. After the relaxation period, participants were asked to
complete the first Affect Grid, followed by the first mDES measure. They ere
then informed that the task was beginning. Participants were then instructed that
they would first see a blank screen for 50 seconds, then a brief (.5 second)
crosshair in the center of the screen followed by a short video. Participants were
randomly assigned into either the smiling or concerned commercial condition and
were subsequently presented with the commercial on the computer screen. After
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watching the commercial, participants completed the second Affect Grid and
mDES. Next, participants completed the posttest measures of their evaluations of
the flu and the flu vaccine.
Analyses and Results
Differences in self-reported affect across age groups and conditions. In
order to test Hypotheses I and II, a series of 2 (commercial condition: smiling vs.
concerned doctor) x 2 (age group) analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used to
compare differences in measures of affect across age groups (older versus
younger adults) and conditions (concerned doctor versus smiling doctor).
Insufficient inter-variable correlations were present within or across the categories
of the affective responding variables (i.e., fEMG, valence/arousal, and discrete
emotions) to justify MANOVA analyses. Thus, separate 2-way (age x condition)
ANOVAs were run for each of the eight following outcome variables: corrugator
activity, zygomaticus activity, change in self-reported valence (from the affect
grid), change in self-reported arousal (from the affect grids), joy, amusement,
fear, and sadness (from the mDES measures). Follow up one-way ANOVAs
estimated the simple main effects of age and condition when a significant
interaction between age and condition was found. Table 5 presents the means and
standard deviations of each affective responding variable as a function of age
group and commercial condition (smiling vs. concerned doctor). Complete
statistics for the two ANOVAs examining the EMG data (corrugator and
zygomaticus) are presented in Table 6.
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Table 5.
Means and Standard Deviations for Affective Responding Variables by Condition
and Age Group

Concerned
doctor
Young

Older
Smiling
doctor
Young

Corr

Zygo

Valen

Arou

Joy

Amus

Fear

Sad

M
SD

2.13
(3.98)

0.67
(1.77)

-0.30
(1.89)

0.35 -0.25 -0.54 0.00
(2.59) (1.51) (1.28) (0.93)

-0.13
(0.61)

M
SD

3.77
(1.30)

-0.22
(0.78)

0.00
(1.65)

0.10 -0.20 0.25
0.05
(2.49) (0.95) (0.72) (0.51)

0.00
(0.65)

M
SD

1.69
(3.22)

0.99
(2.34)

-0.09
(0.79)

0.57 -0.13 0.30 -0.13
(1.73) (0.76) (0.88) (0.55)

-0.09
(0.51)

Older

M
0.97
0.15
-0.05
0.00 -0.33 0.29 -0.10 -0.05
SD (3.56) (1.76) (0.97) (2.14) (0.97) (0.72) (0.30) (0.50)
__________________________________________________________________
Analysis of fEMG Measures
No significant main effects or interactions involving the condition or age
group variables were found on corrugator activity (see Table 2). Thus, older and
younger adults in did not produce different intensities of corrugator activity
across the commercial conditions. For zygomaticus activity, a significant main
effect of age group indicated that relative to older adults (M = -.04, SD = 2.05),
younger adults (M = .83, SD = 2.10) produced more zygomaticus activity across
both conditions. No other main or interaction effects were significant for
zygomaticus activity. These findings were inconsistent with Hypotheses I and II.
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Table 6.
ANOVA Results for the Effects of Age Group and Condition on fEMG
df

F

P

ηp 2

Corr_avg
Condition

(1,76)

1.18

0.281

0.014

AgeGroup

(1,76)

0.09

0.760

0.001

Condition
* AgeGroup

(1,76)

0.63

0.430

0.007

Zyg_avg
Condition

(1,76)

0.83

0.365

0.01

AgeGroup

(1,76)

5.12

0.026*

0.057

Condition
* AgeGroup
(1,76)
0.00
0.952
0.000
__________________________________________________________________
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Analyses of Affect Grid Measures
There were no significant main effects or interactions involving the
condition or age group variables in the ANOVAs examining participants’ change
in valence or arousal (see Table 7 for a complete reporting of the statistics). The
absence of significant effects was inconsistent with Hypotheses I and II.
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Table 7.
ANOVA Results for the Effects of Age Group and Condition on Valence and
Arousal
df

F

P

ηp 2

Valence
Condition

(1,76)

0.08

0.779

0.001

AgeGroup

(1,76)

0.33

0.570

0.004

Condition
* AgeGroup

(1,76)

0.19

0.662

0.002

Arousal
Condition

(1,76)

0.02

0.904

0.000

AgeGroup

(1,76)

0.70

0.404

0.008

Condition
* AgeGroup
(1,76)
0.11
0.744
0.001
__________________________________________________________________
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Analyses of mDES Measures
There were no significant main or interaction effects involving the
condition or age group variables in the ANOVAs examining participants’ change
in joy, fear, or sadness (see Table 8 for a report of the complete statistics). For the
ANOVA conducted on the variable representing changes in amusement, a main
effect of age approached significance. This result indicates a trend by which older
adults (M = .27, SD = .72) across both conditions were more amused after the
commercial in comparison to younger adults (M = -.12, SD = 1.08). Additionally,
a main effect for the commercial condition indicated that participants who
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watched the smiling doctors (M = .30, SD = .80) were more amused compared to
those who watched the concerned doctors (M = .23, SD = -1.23).
Lastly, the ANOVA examining amusement ratings indicated a significant
age group by commercial condition interaction. To explore this interaction,
separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine the effect of the
commercial condition on amusement for each age group separately. A significant
main effect of commercial condition on amusement in the younger adult ANOVA
indicated that younger adults watching the smiling doctor (M = 0.30, SD =0.88)
were more amused than those watching the concerned doctor (M = -0.54, SD =
1.28), F (1, 39) = 6.90, p = 0.012, ηp 2 = .133. The main effect of the commercial
condition on amusement was not significant for older adults (F (1, 39) = .03, p =
0.874, ηp 2 = .001).
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Table 8.
ANOVA Results for the Effects of Age Group and Condition on mDES Measures
df

F

P

ηp 2

Joy
Condition

(1,76)

0.00

0.977

0.000

AgeGroup

(1,76)

0.11

0.745

0.001

Condition
* AgeGroup

(1,76)

0.29

0.591

0.003

Ammusement
Condition

(1,76)

4.77

0.032*

0.054

AgeGroup

(1,76)

3.67

0.059

0.042

Condition
* AgeGroup

(1,76)

4.03

0.048*

0.046

Fear
Condition

(1,76)

1.05

0.309

0.012

AgeGroup

(1,76)

0.10

0.753

0.001

Condition
* AgeGroup

(1,76)

0.00

0.956

0.000

Sadness
Condition

(1,76)

0.00

0.969

0.000

AgeGroup

(1,76)

0.45

0.503

0.005

Condition
* AgeGroup
(1,76)
0.12 0.727
0.001
___________________________________________________________
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Differences in Flu and Flu Vaccine Evaluative Changes Across Conditions
and Age Groups
In order to test Hypotheses III and IV, age differences in evaluative
change regarding the flu vaccine across conditions were examined using an age x
condition MANCOVA, with three dependent variables representing changes in
vaccine-related evaluations after watching the commercial (feelings toward the
vaccine, the risk/benefit score, and the behavioral intentions score). The fourth
evaluative variable of interest, worry about getting the flu itself, was not included
in the MANCOVA as it pertained to the flu itself rather than to the vaccine as the
other outcome measures do. Furthermore, participants’ worry about getting the flu
was not significantly correlated with the other three dependent variables in the
model (p’s >.05) and thus was not included in the multivariate analysis among the
other outcomes which were all significantly correlated (p’s < .05). The outcome
variable representing participants’ worry about getting the flu itself was analyzed
using a separate regression analysis described below. Table 9. provides the
descriptive statistics for participants’ feelings about the vaccine, risks/benefits
score, and behavioral intentions toward vaccination organized by age group and
condition.
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Table 9.
Descriptive Statistics for the Changes in Evaluations of the Flu and Flu Vaccine
by Age Group and Condition
Age Group

Feel about
vaccine

YA
OA

Worry
about flu

YA
OA

Risk/benefits
of vaccine
YA
OA

Intentions

YA
OA

Condition

Mean

Std. Deviation

Concerned
Smiling
Concerned
Smiling

0.47
-0.11
0.74
0.00

(1.42)
(1.76)
(1.28)
(1.11)

Concerned
Smiling
Concerned
Smiling

0.53
-0.16
-0.16
0.95

(1.12)
(0.96)
(1.77)
(1.49)

Concerned
Smiling
Concerned
Smiling

-0.03
-0.01
-0.05
-0.11

(0.29)
(0.21)
(0.38)
(0.34)

Concerned
Smiling
Concerned
Smiling

0.10
-0.16
-0.10
-0.03

(0.79)
(0.60)
(0.73)
(0.36)

__________________________________________________________________
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

MANCOVA for vaccine-related outcomes. As described above, a MANCOVA
examined the main effects of age (older vs. younger) and commercial condition
(smiling vs. concerned doctor) as well as the interaction of age and condition. The
model also included six covariates; the four experience questions (in order to
control for experience with the flu and the flu vaccine) the pre-test measure of
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procedural risk (“If you do get the flu vaccine, how likely are you to experience
side effects related to the vaccine itself?”) and the pre-test measure of worry
toward getting the flu (“How worried are you about getting the flu?”). See Table
10 for a report of the multivariate effects. Regarding the covariates, only baseline
risk perceptions of vaccine-related side-effects was a significant at the
multivariate level (Wilk’s = 0.845, F (3 ,68) = 3.90, p = 0.013, ηp 2 = 0.155). No
other variables in the model were significant in the multivariate analysis.
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Table 10.
Multivariate Effects of Age Group, Condition, and Covariates
P

ηp 2

Factor

Wilks' Lambda

F

df

Had flu last
year?

0.993

0.14

(3, 68)

0.935

0.007

Vaccinated last
year?

0.960

0.89

(3, 68)

0.452

0.040

# vac last 3
years?

0.941

1.33

(3, 68)

0.272

0.059

Doctor
recommend?

0.947

1.21

(3, 68)

0.315

0.053

Pre-test
Side-effect risk

0.845

3.90

(3, 68)

0.013*

0.155

Pre-Worry about
flu

0.907

2.20

(3, 68)

0.097

0.093

AgeGroup

0.960

0.89

(3, 68)

0.451

0.040

Condition

0.911

2.08

(3, 68)

0.112

0.089

AgeGroup *
Condition
0.956
0.98
(3, 68) 0.408
0.044
_________________________________________________________________
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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At the univariate level, the analysis yielded a significant main effect for
the commercial condition (smiling vs. concerned doctor) on feelings toward the
flu vaccine (F(1, 70) = 5.95, p = 0.017, ηp 2 = 0.083). Overall, participants felt
more positively about the flu vaccine in the concerned doctor condition (M = .65,
SD = 1.35) compared to the smiling doctor condition (M = -.10, SD = 1.44). This
finding was inconsistent with Hypothesis III. No other univariate main effects in
the model were found to be significant (see Table 11).
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Table 11.
Univariate F-test Results of Each Factor on Each of the Outcome Measures
Factor

Outcome

df

F

P

ηp 2

Had flu last year?

Feel Vac
Risk/ben
Intentions

(1, 70)
(1, 70)
(1, 70)

0.21
0.29
0.01

0.648
0.594
0.906

0.003
0.004
0.000

Vacc last year?

Feel Vac
Risk/ben
Intentions

(1, 70)
(1, 70)
(1, 70)

1.03
0.05
2.02

0.314
0.821
0.160

0.015
0.001
0.030

# vac last 3 years? Feel Vac
Risk/ben
Intentions
Doctor
recommend?
Feel Vac
Risk/ben
Intentions
Pre-test
Side-effect risk
Feel Vac
Risk/ben
Intentions
Pre-test
Worry about flu
Feel Vac
Risk/ben
Intentions

(1, 70)
(1, 70)
(1, 70)

0.32
0.26
1.89

0.576
0.610
0.174

0.005
0.004
0.028

(1, 70)
(1, 70)
(1, 70)

3.33
0.57
0.14

0.072
0.452
0.711

0.048
0.009
0.002

(1, 70)
(1, 70)
(1, 70)

10.61
0.05
0.43

0.002*
0.822
0.516

0.139
0.001
0.006

(1, 70)
(1, 70)
(1, 70)

2.29
2.07
0.39

0.135
0.155
0.536

0.033
0.030
0.006

Condition

Feel Vac
Risk/ben
Intentions

(1, 70)
(1, 70)
(1, 70)

5.95
0.00
0.44

0.017*
0.982
0.510

0.083
0.000
0.007

AgeGroup

Feel Vac
Risk/ben
Intentions

(1, 70)
(1, 70)
(1, 70)

1.27
0.66
0.51

0.263
0.420
0.478

0.019
0.010
0.008

Condition *
AgeGroup

Feel Vac
(1, 70)
0.50
0.482
0.008
Risk/ben
(1, 70)
0.02
0.878
0.000
Intentions (1, 70)
1.22
0.273
0.018
___________________________________________________________
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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ANCOVA for flu-related worry. An ANCOVA was run on the outcome
variable representing the extent to which participants’ worried about getting the
flu. The ANCOVA included the same predictors as the previous MANCOVA. A
marginally significant age group by commercial condition interaction was found
F(1, 67) = 3.76 p = 0.057. Given a priori predictions in Hypothesis 4 regarding
potential interactions between age group and commercial condition, follow-up
pairwise comparisons were conducted to examine if differences in the change of
flu-related worry were present between older and younger adults in the same
condition. In the concerned-doctor condition, changes in flu related worry did not
differ between older (M =-.18) and younger (M = .45) adults t(39) = -1.23, p =
.22. Similarly, no differences in the change of flu-related worry were found
between older (M = .77) and younger (M = .14) adults in the smiling-doctor
condition t(39) = 1.32, p = .192.
To better understand the nature of the interaction effect, changes in flurelated worry were compared across the commercial conditions separately for
older and younger adults. The extent to which younger adults changed in their
worry about getting the flu did not differ across the concerned (M = .45) and
smiling-doctor (M = .14) commercial conditions, t(39) = -.66, p = .514. However,
older adults who watched the smiling-doctor commercial reported an increase in
worry about getting the flu (M = .77) compared to those who watched the
concerned doctors (M = -.17), t(39) = 2.16, p = .034. Overall, this pattern of
findings did not support the predictions made in Hypothesis IV.
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Interaction Between Commercial Condition and Affective Responses on
Changes in Participants’ Evaluations
In order to test Hypothesis V, multi-step regression analyses examined
whether the extent to which the participants’ affective responding (to the
commercial) related to their changes in evaluations differently across conditions.
Three multi-step regressions were tested for each of the four outcome variables
resulting in a total of 12 regressions. The first two steps were identical across all
12 regressions. The first step of each regression included the covariates
(experience with the flu & flu vaccines). The second step included factors
representing the main effects of age and condition. The factors included in the
third step represented the influence of affective responding and were different
across the three regressions for each outcome variable. In the first regression for
each outcome variable, the third step included corrugator and zygomaticus
activity.
For the second regression, the third step included variables representing
changes in valence and arousal (as measured by the difference between the set of
first and second affect grid scores). Lastly, the third regression included factors
representing changes in joy, amusement, fear, and sadness (as measured by the
difference between the first and second set of mDES scores). These models also
included factors representing all possible interactions between the commercial
condition and the affective responding variables. In total, 12 multi-step
regressions were analyzed for each outcome variable. Given that steps 1 and 2 of
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each regression were not relevant to Hypothesis V, the results for those steps are
presented in Tables 12 and 13 and are not discussed further.
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Table 12.
Steps 1 and 2 of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Relating Covariates and Main Effects on Vaccine Feelings and Flu-Related Worry
Feelings about vaccine
b
Step 1
Had flu last year?
Vac last year?
# vac last 3 years?
Doctor recommend?
Pre-test worry about flu
Pre-test side-effect risk
Step 2
Had flu last year?
Vac last year?
# vac last 3 years?
Doctor recommend?
Pre-test worry about flu
Pre-test side-effect risk
AgeGroup
Condition
AgeGroup*Cond

-0.40
-0.23
0.15
0.74
-0.15
1.97

SE

t

-0.49 -0.81
-0.27 -0.84
-0.14 1.12
-0.37 1.96
-0.12 -1.25
-0.70 2.80

p

Worry about getting the flu
ΔR2
0.17

0.422
0.401
0.266
0.053†
0.217
0.007*

0.48
0.26
0.25
0.37
0.12
0.69
0.48
0.44
0.62

-0.46
-1.02
0.56
1.83
-1.51
3.26
1.26
-1.2
-0.71

Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; † p < .07

0.648
0.314
0.576
0.072
0.135
0.002**
0.21
0.235
0.482

b
0.02
0.04
0.15
0.02
-0.44
-0.23

0.09
-0.22
-0.27
0.08
0.67
-0.19
2.25
0.61
-0.53
-0.44

R2
0.17*

SE

t

-0.49 0.03
-0.27 0.15
-0.14 1.12
-0.37 0.06
-0.12 -3.68
-0.70 -0.33

p

0.48
0.27
0.15
0.37
0.12
0.69
0.48
0.44
0.63

-0.04
-0.01
1.32
0.31
-2.99
-0.64
-1.76
-1.26
2.42

R2
0.2*

0.07

0.27**

0.972
0.883
0.265
0.905
0.000**
0.740

0.26*
-0.02
0.00
0.19
0.11
-0.37
-0.44
-0.85
-0.56
1.52

ΔR2
0.2

0.966
0.995
0.192
0.759
0.004**
0.526
0.083
0.212
0.018**
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Table 13.
Steps 1 and 2 of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Relating Covariates and Main Effects on Risk/Benefits and Intentions Scores
Risk/Benefits Score
b
Step 1
Had flu last year?
Vac last year?
# vac last 3 years?
Doctor recommend?
Pre-test worry about flu
Pre-test side-effect risk
Step 2
Had flu last year?
Vac last year?
# vac last 3 years?
Doctor recommend?
Pre-test worry about flu
Pre-test side-effect risk
AgeGroup
Version
AgeGroup*Cond

-0.05
0.00
0.01
0.08
0.05
-0.04

SE

t

-0.11 -0.46
-0.06 0.06
-0.03 0.23
-0.09 0.89
-0.03 1.68
-0.16 -0.25

p

ΔR2
0.06

0.12
0.06
0.04
0.09
0.03
0.17
0.12
0.11
0.15

-0.54
0.23
0.51
0.76
1.44
-0.23
-0.48
0.13
-0.15

Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; † p <

R2
0.06

0.645
0.952
0.820
0.378
0.097
0.801
0.594
0.821
0.610
0.452
0.155
0.822
0.633
0.901
0.878

b
-0.06
-0.15
-0.08
0.05
0.02
0.22

0.00
-0.06
0.01
0.02
0.07
0.04
-0.04
-0.06
0.01
-0.02

Behavioral Intentions Score
SE

t

-0.23 -0.27
-0.13 -1.22
-0.06 -1.27
-0.18 0.27
-0.06 0.35
-0.33 0.68

p

0.23
0.13
0.07
0.18
0.06
0.34
0.24
0.23
0.31

-0.12
-1.42
-1.37
0.37
0.62
0.65
-0.21
-1.25
1.11

R2
0.09

0.00

0.09

0.786
0.226
0.207
0.790
0.730
0.501

0.06
-0.03
-0.18
-0.10
0.07
0.04
0.22
-0.05
-0.27
0.34

ΔR2
0.09

0.906
0.160
0.174
0.711
0.536
0.516
0.835
0.217
0.273
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Step 3 of the regressions examining effects of age, condition and fEMG
activity on each outcome. There were no significant main effects or interactions
involving the fEMG variables for any of the four outcomes (see Tables 14 and 15
for a full report of the Step 3 statistics). Interestingly, despite controlling for the
direct and moderating effects of fEMG activity, the age-group by commercial
condition interaction that was found in tests of Hypothesis IV remained
significant (see Table 14). Thus even when controlling for fEMG activity, older
adults watching the smiling-doctor commercial reported an increase in worry
relative to older adults who watched the concerned-doctor commercial.
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Table 14.
Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining Effects of fEMG on Vaccine Feelings and Flu-Related Worry
Feelings about vaccine
Worry about getting the flu
b
SE
t
p
ΔR2
R2
b
SE
t
p
ΔR2 R2
Step 3
0.06
0.32
0.1 0.37*
Had flu last year?
-0.31 0.50 -0.61
0.543
0.04
0.49 0.07 0.940
Vac last year?
-0.28 0.28 -0.99
0.326
0.04
0.27 0.16 0.874
# vac last 3 years?
0.06 0.15 0.41
0.681
0.25
0.15 1.64 0.106
Doctor recommend?
0.46 0.39 1.19
0.238
0.06
0.38 0.16 0.875
Pre-test worry about flu
Pre-test side-effect risk
AgeGroup
Condition
AgeGroup*Cond
Corr_avg
Zyg_avg
AgeGroup*Corr_avg
Cond*Corr_avg
AgeGroup* Cond*Corr_avg
AgeGroup*Zyg_avg
Cond*Zyg_avg
AgeGroup*Cond*Zyg_avg

-0.17
2.21
0.74
-0.37

0.13
0.76
0.58
0.60

-1.31
2.89
1.29
-0.61

0.196
0.005**
0.202
0.541

-0.43
0.04
-0.83
-0.61

0.13 -3.35 0.001**
0.75 0.05 0.959
0.56 -1.47 0.147
0.59 -1.03 0.309

-0.65
0.23
-0.11
-0.25
-0.21
0.27
-0.48
0.07
0.69

0.76
0.21
0.17
0.21
0.24
0.25
0.45
0.28
0.53

-0.85
1.06
-0.67
-1.18
-0.89
1.09
-1.08
0.27
1.29

0.397
0.295
0.506
0.241
0.377
0.280
0.285
0.790
0.201

1.57
0.09
-0.17
-0.13
-0.11
0.07
-0.25
0.25
-0.22

0.74
0.21
0.17
0.21
0.23
0.24
0.44
0.27
0.52

Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; † p < .07

2.11 0.039**
0.45 0.653
-1.02 0.312
-0.60 0.552
-0.47 0.637
0.28 0.777
-0.56 0.575
0.92 0.360
-0.41 0.680
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Table 15.
Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining Effects of fEMG on Risk/Benefits and Intentions Scores

-0.02
0.02
0.02
0.11
0.04
0.00
-0.14
-0.13
0.08
-0.08
-0.03
0.08
0.10

0.12
0.07
0.04
0.10
0.03
0.19
0.14
0.15
0.19
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.06

-0.16
0.34
0.59
1.18
1.22
-0.02
-0.98
-0.89
0.45
-1.59
-0.62
1.59
1.66

0.871
0.737
0.560
0.245
0.228
0.982
0.330
0.380
0.657
0.117
0.541
0.117
0.103

-0.03
-0.21
-0.11
0.07
0.01
0.47
-0.04
-0.38
0.41
0.03
-0.08
-0.02
0.03

Behavioral Intentions Score
SE
t
p
ΔR2 R2
0.07 0.16
0.25
-0.14 0.889
0.14
-1.50 0.139
0.08
-1.43 0.157
0.19
0.36 0.718
0.06
0.11 0.913
0.38
1.25 0.216
0.28
-0.14 0.889
0.30
-1.28 0.206
0.37
1.11 0.272
0.11
0.29 0.777
0.08
-0.95 0.344
0.11
-0.23 0.822
0.12
0.29 0.774

-0.08
0.13
0.03
-0.15

0.06 -1.36
0.11 1.19
0.07 0.47
0.13 -1.12

0.179
0.237
0.638
0.266

-0.01
0.08
0.03
-0.11

0.12
0.22
0.14
0.26

b
Step 3
Had flu last year?
Vac last year?
# vac last 3 years?
Doctor recommend?
Pre-test worry about flu
Pre-test side-effect risk
AgeGroup
Version
AgeGroup*Cond
Corr_avg
Zyg_avg
AgeGroup*Corr_avg
Cond*Corr_avg
AgeGroup*
Cond*Corr_avg
AgeGroup*Zyg_avg
Cond*Zyg_avg
AgeGroup*Cond*Zyg_avg

Risk/Benefits Score
SE
t
p

ΔR2
R2
0.07 0.13

b

-0.12
0.36
0.22
-0.42

0.906
0.719
0.824
0.679
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Step 3 of the regressions examining effects of age, condition, valence and
arousal on each outcome. Tables 16 and 17 present a full report of the Step 3
statistics for the analyses examining effects of age, condition, valence and arousal
on the four outcome variables. As can be seen on Table 16, a near-significant age
x valence interaction (p = .057) was yielded in the regression predicting worry
about getting the flu. Although not predicted, this interaction was further explored
because of its potential relevance to the overarching topic of this study. To do so,
the continuous valence-change scores of the participants were collapsed into three
categorical levels: high, medium and low levels of valence change. The high level
incorporated all valence change scores that were one standard deviation above the
mean, the medium level incorporated all the valence change scores that were
between one standard deviation below the mean and one standard deviation above
the mean, and the low level incorporated scores that were one standard deviation
below the mean. As mentioned previously, higher scores on this variable indicate
increases in positive valence from before viewing the commercial to after viewing
the commercial.
Subsequently, the worry scores of younger and older adults were
separately examined, i.e., compared across the three valence-change levels. For
younger adults, the worry scores at the three levels of the valence change variable
(high M = .33, medium M = .28, low M = .23) were not significantly different
from one another (p’s >.05). For older adults, the worry scores at each level of the
valence change variable were significantly different from one another (p’s < .05).
Thus, older adults who experienced high levels of valence change reported
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worrying less about the flu (M = -.56) than older adults who experienced medium
(M = .37, t(39) = -3.83 , p < .001) and low levels of valence change (M = 1.30,
t(39) = -3.83, p < .001). This indicates that increases in positive valence related to
less flu-related worry for older adults. No other main or interaction effects
involving effects of valence and arousal on any of the outcome variables were
significant (see Tables 16 and 17).
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Table 16.
Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Valence and Arousal on Vaccine Feelings and Flu-Related Worry

b
Step 3
Had flu last year?
Vac last year?
# vac last 3 years?
Doctor recommend?
Pre-test worry about flu
Pre-test side-effect risk
AgeGroup
Condition
AgeGroup*Cond
Valence
AgeGroup*Valence
Cond*Valence
AgeGroup*Cond*Valence
Arousal
AgeGroup*Arousal
Cond*Arousal
AgeGroup*Cond*Arousal

-0.28
-0.25
0.10
0.60
-0.22
2.40
0.50
-0.50
-0.45
0.07
0.07
-0.18
0.11
0.03
-0.24
-0.15
0.53

Feelings about vaccine
t
p
ΔR2 R2
b
0.05 0.31
0.60 -0.48
0.635
0.42
0.30 -0.83
0.411
0.04
0.16
0.64
0.525
0.15
0.40
1.50
0.140
0.35
0.13 -1.69
0.097
-0.32
0.75
3.17
0.002**
-0.82
0.51
0.97
0.339
-0.76
0.48 -1.03
0.308
-0.72
0.67 -0.66
0.510
1.56
0.26
0.25
0.805
0.26
0.33
0.21
0.834
-0.53
0.63 -0.29
0.774
-0.42
0.77
0.14
0.891
-0.34
0.18
0.14
0.889
-0.03
0.25 -0.96
0.339
0.36
0.30 -0.51
0.610
0.08
0.38
1.38
0.172
-0.58
SE

Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; † p < .07

SE
0.50
0.25
0.14
0.33
0.11
0.63
0.43
0.40
0.56
0.22
0.28
0.52
0.64
0.15
0.21
0.25
0.32

Worry about getting the flu
t
p
ΔR2
R2
0.27 0.54**
0.85
0.398
0.15
0.885
1.07
0.290
1.05
0.297
-2.93
0.005**
-1.30
0.199
-1.77
0.082
-1.81
0.076
2.78
0.007**
1.19
0.239
-1.90
0.063†
-0.80
0.425
-0.53
0.597
-0.22
0.826
1.70
0.095
0.31
0.756
-1.85
0.070
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Table 17.
Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining Effects Of Valence and Arousal on Risk/Benefits and Intentions Scores

b
Step 3
Had flu last year?
Vac last year?
# vac last 3 years?
Doctor recommend?
Pre-test worry about flu
Pre-test side-effect risk
AgeGroup
Version
AgeGroup*Cond
Valence
AgeGroup*Valence
Cond*Valence
AgeGroup*Cond*Valence
Arousal
AgeGroup*Arousal
Cond*Arousal
AgeGroup*Cond*Arousal

0.03
0.03
0.01
0.07
0.05
-0.07
-0.09
-0.02
0.03
-0.07
0.00
0.10
-0.07
0.05
-0.15
-0.02
0.14

Risk/Benefits Score
SE
t
p
0.14
0.07
0.04
0.09
0.03
0.17
0.12
0.11
0.15
0.06
0.08
0.14
0.18
0.04
0.06
0.07
0.09

0.19
0.44
0.36
0.78
1.59
-0.41
-0.77
-0.22
0.20
-1.11
0.06
0.70
-0.42
1.25
-2.63
-0.32
1.65

0.850
0.663
0.722
0.439
0.116
0.681
0.445
0.829
0.844
0.270
0.954
0.489
0.677
0.216
0.011
0.753
0.105

ΔR2
R2
0.14 0.2

b
0.00
-0.16
-0.08
0.13
0.04
0.10
-0.08
-0.22
0.30
0.02
-0.09
-0.15
0.23
0.00
0.00
-0.12
0.02

Behavioral Intentions Score
SE
t
p
ΔR2
0.06
0.29
0.02 0.987
0.15 -1.09 0.281
0.08 -0.96 0.342
0.20
0.64 0.527
0.06
0.61 0.545
0.37
0.26 0.793
0.25 -0.33 0.742
0.24 -0.92 0.363
0.33
0.92 0.361
0.13
0.16 0.875
0.16 -0.55 0.584
0.31 -0.50 0.622
0.38
0.62 0.540
0.09 -0.05 0.963
0.12
0.00 0.998
0.15 -0.80 0.427
0.19
0.11 0.913

R2
0.15
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Step 3 of the regressions examining effects of age, condition, and mDES
emotions on each outcome. Tables 18 and 19 present a full report of the Step 3
statistics for the analyses examining effects of age, condition, and mDES
emotions (joy, amusement, fear, and sadness) on the four outcome variables There
were no significant main effects or interactions involving any of the mDES
variables on the outcome variables representing feelings toward the flu and worry
about contracting the flu. Interestingly, despite controlling for the influence of the
mDES variables, the interaction found between age-group and commercial
condition (smiling doctor vs. concerned doctor) in the test of Hypothesis IV
remained significant such that older adults in the smiling-doctor condition
reported more flu-related worry in comparison to older adults in the concerneddoctor condition.
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Table 18.
Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining Effects of mDES measures on Vaccine Feelings and Worry about Getting the
Flu.
Feelings about vaccine
Worry about getting the flu
b
SE
t
p
ΔR2 R2
b
SE
t
p
ΔR2
R2
Step 3
0.14 0.4
0.29 0.56**
Had flu last year?
-0.57 0.62 -0.91 0.368
0.19 0.54 0.34
0.733
Vac last year?
-0.27 0.33 -0.80 0.425
-0.11 0.29 -0.37
0.714
# vac last 3 years?
0.04 0.17 0.24 0.810
0.15 0.15 1.01
0.317
Doctor recommend?
0.72 0.43 1.67 0.102
0.36 0.38 0.94
0.349
Pre-test worry about flu
-0.17 0.15 -1.17 0.246
-0.30 0.13 -2.41
0.02*
Pre-test side-effect risk
2.06 0.83 2.50 0.016
-0.52 0.72 -0.72
0.477
AgeGroup
0.79 0.60 1.31 0.195
-0.52 0.53 -0.98
0.332
Condition
-0.58 0.54 -1.06 0.292
-0.71 0.47 -1.49
0.141
AgeGroup*Cond
-0.65 0.81 -0.80 0.426
1.52 0.71 2.14
0.037*
Joy
0.15 0.29 0.53 0.599
-0.03 0.25 -0.13
0.893
AgeGroup*Joy
0.19 0.54 0.35 0.730
0.39 0.48 0.83
0.411
Cond*Joy
-0.50 0.57 -0.88 0.381
-0.24 0.50 -0.49
0.624
AgeGroup*Cond*Joy
0.10 0.83 0.12 0.905
0.20 0.72 0.28
0.780
Amusement
0.04 0.34 0.11 0.910
0.13 0.30 0.43
0.671
AgeGroup*Amuse
-0.03 0.81 -0.04 0.967
-1.22 0.71 -1.72
0.092
Cond*Amuse
-0.40 0.61 -0.66 0.515
0.00 0.53 0.01
0.996
AgeGroup*Cond*Amuse
0.94 1.03 0.91 0.366
0.85 0.90 0.95
0.348
Fear
0.21 0.35 0.60 0.551
0.54 0.30 1.78
0.081
AgeGroup*Fear
-1.83 0.98 -1.88 0.066
1.33 0.85 1.56
0.124
Cond*Fear
-0.64 1.10 -0.58 0.568
-0.85 0.96 -0.88
0.382
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AgeGroup*Cond*Fear
Sadness
AgeGroup*Sadness
Cond*Sadness
AgeGroup*Cond*Sadness

2.37
-0.57
0.14
0.36
0.32

1.95 1.21
0.52 -1.09
0.82 0.17
1.27 0.28
1.62 0.20

0.231
0.279
0.869
0.780
0.846

-2.74
-0.31
1.09
0.31
0.20

1.70 -1.61
0.45 -0.67
0.71 1.53
1.11 0.28
1.41 0.14

0.114
0.503
0.132
0.782
0.890
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For the outcome variable representing the difference between the risk and
benefits of flu vaccines, a significant age group by fear interaction was observed
(see Table 19). As mentioned above, positive values for the risk/benefit score
indicate that the participant perceived more benefits and fewer risks related to the
flu vaccine. The interaction was explored further by testing simple slopes for the
association between age group and changes in self-reported fear on the mDES.
To do so, the continuous fear-change scores of the participants were collapsed
into three categorical levels: high, medium and low levels of fear change (i.e.,
change from before to after viewing the stimulus face). The high level
incorporated all fear-change scores that were one standard deviation above the
mean, the medium level incorporated all the fear-change scores that were between
one standard deviation below the mean and one standard deviation above the
mean, and the low level incorporated scores that were one standard deviation
below the mean. As mentioned previously, higher scores on this variable indicate
increases in fear from before viewing the commercial to after viewing the
commercial. Subsequently, the risk/benefit scores of younger and older adults
were separately examined, i.e., compared across the three fear-change levels. For
younger adults, the slopes (representing the relation between fear change and the
risk/benefit score) at the three levels of the fear change variable (high M = -.01,
medium M = -.02, low M = -.05) did not differ from one another (p’s >.05). For
older adults, the slopes at each level of fear change were significantly different
from one another. Thus, older adults who experienced high levels of changes in
fear demonstrated lower risk/benefit scores (M = -.34,) in comparison to older
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adults who experienced medium (M = -.05, t(39) = -2.59, p = .013) and lower
levels (M = .23, t(39) = -2.59, p = .013) of changes in fear. This indicates that for
older adults, greater increases in fear were related to lower risk/benefit scores.
More specifically, the more fear older adults experienced as a result of viewing
the commercial, the more risky they perceived the flu vaccine to be.
For the variable representing changes in behavioral intentions regarding
the flu vaccine, a three-way (age group by condition by joy) interaction emerged
(see Table 12). The interaction between condition and change in joy (i.e.,
differences in joy score from before to after viewing the commercial) was also
significant but was not interpretable in the model as it was qualified by the
significant three-way interaction. To further examine the three-way interaction,
regression analyses were conducted for older and younger adults separately. For
the younger adults, the interaction between commercial condition and joy-change
scores was significant, b = -.67, t(39) = -2.34, p = .030, whereas the interaction
was not significant in the regression for older adults, b = .46, t(39) = 1.55, p =
.134.
The significant commercial x joy interaction in the younger adult
regression was explored further by examining the simple slopes representing the
influence of changes in joy on the intentions score for each commercial condition
separately. As in the previous examinations of simple effects, the continuous joychange scores of the participants were collapsed into three categorical levels:
high, medium and low levels of joy change (i.e., change from before to after
viewing the stimulus face). The high level incorporated all joy-change scores that
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were one standard deviation above the mean, the medium level incorporated all
the joy-change scores that were between one standard deviation below the mean
and one standard deviation above the mean, and the low level incorporated scores
that were one standard deviation below the mean. As mentioned previously,
higher scores on this variable indicate increases in joy from before viewing the
commercial to after viewing the commercial. Subsequently, the intentions scores
of younger adults in the smiling and concerned-doctor condition were separately
examined, i.e., compared across the three joy-change levels. The analyses
showed that changes in intentions scores differed across conditions only for those
younger adults who experienced changes in joy that were one standard deviation
above the mean. Younger adults in the concerned doctor condition who
experienced high levels of increases in joy had marginally greater intentions (M =
.38) compared to the younger adults in the smiling doctor condition who also had
the highest increases in joy (M = -.46) t(39) = -2.04, p = 0.055.
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Table 19.
Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining Effects of mDES measures on Risk/Benefits and Intentions Scores

b

SE

Risk/Benefits Score
t
p

ΔR2

R2

0.22

0.28

b

Behavioral Intentions Score
SE
t
p

Step 3Had flu last year?

-0.17

0.15

-1.14

0.260

-0.17

0.28

-0.61

0.547

Vac last year?

0.00

0.08

0.06

0.951

-0.18

0.15

-1.20

0.235

# vac last 3 years?

0.00

0.04

0.08

0.940

-0.15

0.08

-1.87

0.067

Doctor recommend?

0.03

0.10

0.30

0.766

0.04

0.20

0.20

0.841

Pre-test worry about flu

0.03

0.03

0.98

0.331

0.04

0.07

0.62

0.539

Pre-test side-effect risk

0.01

0.20

0.03

0.974

0.00

0.38

-0.01

0.991

AgeGroup

-0.03

0.14

-0.24

0.814

0.04

0.27

0.16

0.874

Version

-0.02

0.13

-0.17

0.865

-0.33

0.25

-1.33

0.188

AgeGroup*Cond

-0.12

0.19

-0.63

0.531

0.47

0.37

1.26

0.213

Joy

0.04

0.07

0.59

0.559

0.23

0.13

1.74

0.088

AgeGroup*Joy

-0.10

0.13

-0.75

0.457

-0.46

0.25

-1.84

0.071

Cond*Joy

-0.01

0.14

-0.09

0.926

-0.59

0.26

-2.27

0.027*

AgeGroup*Cond*Joy

-0.09

0.20

-0.45

0.654

0.79

0.38

2.10

0.041*

Amusement

-0.01

0.08

-0.10

0.922

-0.13

0.15

-0.83

0.411

AgeGroup*Amuse

0.00

0.19

0.01

0.992

-0.14

0.37

-0.39

0.699

Cond*Amuse

0.10

0.15

0.66

0.514

-0.19

0.28

-0.68

0.500

AgeGroup*Cond*Amuse

-0.06

0.25

-0.24

0.814

0.27

0.47

0.57

0.568

Fear

0.01

0.08

0.16

0.873

-0.13

0.16

-0.85

0.402

AgeGroup*Fear

-0.51

0.23

-2.17

0.035*

0.01

0.44

0.02

0.988

Cond*Fear

0.06

0.26

0.22

0.826

0.28

0.50

0.55

0.584

ΔR2

R2

0.28

0.37
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AgeGroup*Cond*Fear

0.01

0.46

0.03

0.980

0.16

0.89

0.18

0.856

Sadness

-0.03

0.12

-0.26

0.794

-0.21

0.24

-0.88

0.384

AgeGroup*Sadness

-0.26

0.19

-1.32

0.193

0.46

0.37

1.22

0.227

Cond*Sadness

-0.23

0.30

-0.76

0.450

-0.66

0.58

-1.15

0.255

AgeGroup*Cond*Sadness

0.28

0.39

0.73

0.466

0.51

0.74

0.69

0.494
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Discussion
The aim of this study was to explore how affective responses to emotional
expressions presented during an influenza vaccine commercial could change
participants’ evaluations of the flu vaccine (i.e., behavioral intentions, risk
perceptions, and integral feelings). The study also included older and younger
adults to examine whether age-related increases in the preference for positive over
negative information could lead to differential influences of positive and negative
facial expressions on the above-mentioned evaluations.
The overall pattern of results indicates that younger adults were somewhat
more affected than older adults by the facial expression manipulation in terms of
self-reported changes in affect. Regarding the influence of the manipulation on
evaluations, the concerned doctors elicited more positive feelings about the flu
vaccine for both older and younger adults. Furthermore, a significant interaction
between age group and condition on flu-related worry demonstrated that in
comparison to their younger counterparts, the facial manipulation only influenced
the worry evaluations of older adults. In addition, findings suggest that the
evaluations of older and younger adults depended on their changes in affect from
before to after watching the commercial. The next sections discuss the results for
the tests of each hypothesis in greater detail.
The Influence of Age Group and Condition on Affective Responding
For Hypothesis I, an effect of the commercial condition (smiling vs.
concerned doctor) on participants’ changes in affective states was predicted.
Specifically, it was predicted that relative to the concerned-doctor commercial,
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participants watching the smiling-doctor commercial would report increases in
positive affect, joy, amusement, and zygomaticus activity. This prediction was
partially supported. Across age groups, participants who watched the smiling
doctor were more amused than those who watched the concerned doctor. No other
affective measure, including fEMG measures, differed across the commercial
conditions.
Hypothesis II predicted an age group by condition interaction in which
older adults would report more positive change in valence and positive discrete
emotions in the smile condition than would younger adults and would report less
negative change in valence and negative discrete emotions in the concerneddoctor condition. A significant age group by condition interaction was obtained,
yet it was not in line with the predictions. That is, only younger adults differed in
affective responding across commercial conditions. Specifically, younger adults
who watched the smiling doctor reported a greater increase in amusement than
those who watched the concerned doctor. In fact, the latter reported a decrease in
amusement.
The lack of difference in amusement across conditions for older adults
implies that younger adults may be more likely to be impacted by incidental facial
expressions in terms of their self-reported affect. Interestingly, the marginally
significant main effect of age group on amusement indicated that older adults
might have been more amused across both conditions. This finding may indicate a
general tendency for older adults to experience more positive affect (albeit
amusement) regardless of the facial expressions they observed during the
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commercial. However, given that the effect did not reach a conventional level of
significance, no conclusion can be confidently drawn.
Interestingly, older adults demonstrated lower levels of baseline-relative
zygomaticus activity in both conditions. This finding is consistent with previous
work suggesting that older adults have overall lower levels of facial responding to
affective facial stimuli (e.g., Slessor et al., 2014). However, lower levels of facial
responding may not necessarily reflect lower levels of experienced emotion. This
possible dissociation between facial activity and self-reported emotion is also
suggested by this study’s finding that younger adults did not differ in their
corrugator or zygomaticus activity across conditions but did report increases in
amusement.
The Influence of Age Group and Condition on Evaluations of the Flu and Flu
Vaccine
For Hypothesis III it was proposed that participants in the negative
concerned-doctor condition would report a greater increase in how much they
were worried about getting the flu and their perceived risks of vaccination
compared to participants in the positive smiling-doctor condition. In addition, it
was predicted that participants in the positive smiling-doctor condition would
report a greater increase in how positively they felt about the vaccines themselves,
and in their behavioral intentions regarding vaccines compared to those in the
negative concerned-doctor condition.
Although a significant effect was found for the influence of commercial
condition on evaluations of the flu vaccine, it was not in the predicted direction.
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Across age groups, participants felt more positively about the flu vaccine in the
concerned-doctor condition compared to the smiling-doctor condition. Due to the
complexity of the stimuli (see limitations), it is difficult to determine exactly why
participants felt more positively about the vaccine after watching the concerned
doctors.
An examination of the effects (or lack thereof) of the commercial
condition on the other outcome measures potentially could shed some light on
why concerned doctors made participants feel better about the vaccine. Across
age groups, the expressions of the doctors had no impact on either the risk/benefit
or behavioral intentions scores (other than for a small subset of younger adults
who experienced relatively high increases in the experience of joy, see discussion
below). Moreover, as will be discussed below in greater detail, changes in flurelated worry differed by condition only for older adult participants. Thus it is
especially difficult to determine participants watching the concerned doctors felt
better about the vaccine relative to those who watched the smiling doctors.
It is possible that the increase in positive feelings about the flu vaccine for
participants in the concerned-doctor condition resulted from greater affective
compatibility between the facial expressions and audio message in the concerned
doctor condition. Insofar as the expressions of the concerned doctors matched the
serious tone of the recorded message, feelings about the vaccine may have been
bolstered. In contrast, the jovial expressions and the serious messages in the
smiling-doctor condition may have been perceived as incongruent. Future
research is needed to examine how participants’ feelings toward a target are
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influenced by the affective congruence between the visual and informational
components of a message.
For Hypothesis IV an interaction was predicted between age group and
condition on changes in evaluations toward the flu and the flu vaccine.
Specifically, it was predicted that compared to their younger counterparts, older
adults would have greater positive changes in evaluations toward the flu and the
flu vaccine in the smiling-doctor condition and less negative changes in
evaluations of the flu in the concerned-doctor condition. The results only
indicated a significant age group by condition interaction on changes in the extent
to which participants were worried about getting the flu after watching the
commercial. For Hypothesis IV, it was predicted that evaluations would differ
between older and younger adults within the same condition. Although the results
did not support this specific prediction, it was discovered that older adults’ who
watched the smiling-doctors reported an increase in worry about getting the flu
compared their age mates who watched the concerned doctors. In fact, older
adults in the concerned-doctor condition actually reported being less worried
about the flu than before viewing the commercial. Younger adults were not
differentially influenced by the commercial condition.
Given that older (and younger) adults felt more positively about the flu
vaccine after watching the concerned doctors, it follows that they would then also
be less worried about contracting the flu. Interestingly, younger adults did not
differ in their worry-change scores across commercial conditions. This may imply

103
that younger adults’ perceived susceptibility for contracting the flu is not easily
manipulated by affective facial expressions in flu commercials.
Overall, the presence of direct and moderating effects of the commercial
condition on some outcomes and not others may imply that manipulating the
doctors’ facial expressions only impacted more general affective evaluations (i.e.,
worry about the flu and feelings about the vaccine) rather than more cognitive
evaluations of risks and benefits or behavioral intentions.
The Moderating Influences of Changes in Affective Responding on Flu
Vaccine and Flu-Related Evaluations
Hypothesis V proposed that the extent to which participants changed their
evaluations of the flu and flu vaccines would not only differ across conditions and
age groups, but that it would also depend on how the participants were
emotionally impacted by the commercials. Partial support for this prediction was
present for two of the outcome variables: feelings about the flu vaccine, and the
risk/benefit score. Importantly, significant moderating effects of only the selfreported measures of affective valence and discrete emotions were observed.
Measures of fEMG activity did not have any direct or moderating effects on any
of the outcome variables.
The interaction of age group and valence change on feelings about the flu
vaccine was marginally significant. Although this interaction was not predicted,
the simple slopes were further explored because of the potential relevance of such
an interaction to the overarching topic of this study. Across conditions, older
adults who reported greater pre- vs. post-viewing increases in positive valence
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were less worried about contracting the flu than were older adults who reported
lesser increases in positive valence. No effect of valence on flu-related worry was
present for younger adults. Similarly, for the risk/benefit score, an age group by
fear change interaction was found. Follow-up analyses indicated that the more
fear older adults experienced as a result of the commercial, the more risky they
perceived the flu vaccine to be.
Given that older and younger adults did not differ in terms of their
changes in valence or fear across conditions, this pattern of results may imply that
evaluations of potentially negative outcomes (i.e., risk of contracting the flu,
experiencing side effects) are influenced by changes in state affect for older adults
only. More research is needed to confirm that this influence of affect is only
evident for potentially negative outcomes or if it can be extended to positive
outcomes as well for older adults.
Lastly, for intentions toward vaccination, an age group by condition
interaction was moderated further by the extent to which participants changed in
their experience of joy. Specifically, younger adults in the concerned-doctor
condition who experienced the highest increases in joy had greater behavioral
intentions compared to the younger adults in the smiling-doctor condition who
also had the highest increases in joy. This pattern of results is difficult to explain
given that changes in the experience of joy (or any other affective variable) did
not predict changes in other evaluations (e.g., risk/benefit score, feelings about the
vaccine or worry about the flu) for younger adults. Therefore, based on the other
patterns in the data, it is not clear why the intentions of younger adults with high
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levels of joy differed across the emotion conditions. Furthermore, this finding is
limited in its external generalizability given that younger adults’ intention scores
changed across condition only when they experienced above average changes in
joy. Thus, relative to older adults, younger adults’ affective responding to the
commercial was not as closely related to changes in evaluations.
Limitations and Future Directions
Several limitations of the current study restricted the interpretability of the
results. First and foremost, the commercial stimuli were extremely complex as
they were originally intended to resemble a commercial advertisement. This
complexity stemmed in part from the content of the messages, which discussed
information about the flu and flu vaccines. Information about the flu pertained to
its symptomology and contagiousness. Information about the vaccine consisted of
framed messages promoting vaccination and a brief mention of the potential for
vaccine-related side effects. A mix of positively and negatively framed messages
was used in order to provide an affectively balanced promotion of flu vaccines.
This balance was important given that the differential framing of health
promotion messages can change affective evaluations of those messages (Mikels
et al., under revision).
In summary, the main stimuli in this study included mixed affective
information accompanied by videos in which facial expressions were either
consistent or inconsistent with the serious tone of the messages. This complexity
made it difficult to interpret whether the affective and evaluative reactions to the
task were due to the messages or the faces. Future research with aims similar to
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the present investigation should thus use more concise and uniformly framed
messages that pertain to one target (e.g., the vaccine itself).
Furthermore, given that the commercial conditions failed to elicit different
patterns of facial activity, certain methodological changes to the task can be
considered for future research. For instance, more control could have been
achieved by presenting participants with a video of the doctors posing a neutral
expression rather than a blank screen during the baseline period. Such a video
would provide researchers with a baseline period that was more comparable to the
actual facial stimuli, thus making the baseline-relative fEMG scores more valid
measures of differences in facial responding to affective stimuli.
Conclusion
Overall, results of this study suggest that concerned rather than happy
facial expression may be more effective at increasing positive feelings toward
vaccinations given that both older and younger adults who watched the concerned
doctors felt more positively about the vaccine. Furthermore, older adults’
evaluations of the flu and the flu vaccine were dependent on their changes in
affective responding to the commercial. Specifically, increased self-reported
positive affect was related to decreased worry about getting the flu. Furthermore,
when older participants reported increased fear they also perceived the flu vaccine
to be more risky than beneficial. These findings imply that changes in state affect
resulting for acquiring information about a target behavior can change evaluations
of that behavior, especially for older adults.
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General Discussion
Affect, regardless of whether it is related (integral) or unrelated
(incidental) to the present decision or evaluation target, can influence how
individuals evaluate uncertain prospects and can thus have significant
implications for decisions involving risk (Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam,
2014). Specifically, incidental affective states that are positive have been
associated with increased risk-seeking behavior whereas negative states have been
associated with risk-averse behavior.
Some of the most prominent and potent sources of incidental affect are
facial expressions. Merely viewing facial expressions has in some cases been
sufficient enough to elicit emotional experiences that corresponded to the viewed
expression (Lishner, Cooter, & Zald, 2008; Schneider, Gur, Gur, & Muenz,
1994). Moreover, in demonstrations of the facial feedback hypothesis, the
production of emotional facial expressions (either through spontaneous mimicry
or through instructed posing) has elicited affective experiences that corresponded
to the produced expression (e.g., Larsen et al., 1992). Converging evidence
suggests that facial expressions can create an affective context that can impact
risk-related evaluations and decisions (e.g., Habib, Cassotti, Moutier, Houdé, &
Borst, 2015; Murphy, & Zajonc, 1993; Ottati, Terkildsen, & Hubbard, 1997).
Given these findings, it is surprising that so few studies have examined whether
emotional facial expressions are capable of influencing more complex risk-related
decisions and evaluation in the real world domains of health and finance.
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Thus, the overarching goal of the present investigation was to examine the
role of emotional facial expressions in risk-related judgments and decisions. The
first study aimed to examine how posing emotional facial expressions influenced
risk-taking and risk-avoidant behavior in a financial investment task. The second
study aimed to examine how emotional expressions presented during an influenza
vaccine commercial could change participants’ evaluations and feelings regarding
the flu and the flu vaccine. Each study also examined how either risk-related
decisions or evaluations were associated with individuals’ affective responding to
either the posing (Study 1) or passive viewing (Study 2) of facial expressions.
Furthermore, both studies assessed whether multiple forms of affective
responding could moderate the influence that different affective facial expressions
had on the decision or evaluation being made. In addition to assessing affective
responding via self-report measures of affect, both studies measured facial
electromyography (fEMG) in order to capture participants’ facial muscle activity
as they either posed or passively viewed facial expressions. Each study examined
whether decisions or evaluations were guided not only by the valence of a facial
expression, but also by the extent to which participants modeled the facial
expression stimuli (either via instructions in Study 1 or spontaneously in Study 2).
Overall, the effects of posing and viewing facial expressions that were found in
previous research were not replicated in either of the present studies.
Although the main hypotheses were not supported, there was limited support for
the general relations between affective responding and risk-related decisions
(Study 1) and evaluations (Study 2). The next section contextualizes the findings
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of each study in the larger literature on facial expressions and affective
responding. Afterwards, a discussion will follow regarding the overall
implications of the present research on our understanding of how emotional facial
expressions can influence complex risk-related decisions and evaluation.

Impact of Present Research on Understanding How Emotional Facial
Expressions Influence Self-Reported Affect
In both studies, the manipulations of facial expressions did not have the
expected influence on participants’ affective responding. The first study predicted
that posing facial expressions would influence self-reported affect. Specifically, it
was predicted that posing fearful faces would induce the greatest decrease in selfreported valence and that posing happy expressions would result in an increase in
valence. Even though these predictions were well reasoned and based on previous
research, the results were not consistent with the above-mentioned findings in the
previous literature. Specifically, although participants’ patterns of fEMG activity
demonstrated that they followed the instructions in the posing task overall,
participants reported the greatest reduction in valence in the neutral affect
condition.
One can speculate that methodological differences between Study 1 and
previous research may have contributed to the absence of the predicted effects.
Perhaps the current posing task had more of an integral rather than incidental
effect as it was performed embedded between the blocks of the investment task.
In addition the instructions, which required participants to rate the intensity of the
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faces, could have also introduced an integral focus on the facial expressions.
Thus, it is possible that from the participants’ perspective, the posing task was a
central part of the investment task rather than an unrelated, incidental component.
Such an explicit posing procedure is methodologically different from previous
research that used less explicit techniques. For instance, holding a pen in the
mouth in a manner that creates different expressions has been shown to
manipulate participants’ feeling states (Niedenthal, Brauer, Halberstadt, & InnesKer, 2001; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988).
Alternately, it is important to note that explicit posing tasks used in early
research on facial feedback and emotion were successful in changing self-reported
affective states (e.g., Laird, 1974). Such early studies embedded the facial posing
manipulation within a larger experimental context that involved making social
evaluations. Thus it is possible that facial posing manipulations may be more
affectively influential if embedded within social decisions rather than financial
decisions which are more individualistic in nature and may thus restrict the
influence of more socially-manifested phenomena such as facial feedback.
The second study examined whether manipulating the facial expressions
of doctors (smiling vs. concerned) in a flu vaccine commercial could alter
participants’ affective responses as assessed by fEMG and self-reported measures
of affect and emotion. The study included older and younger adult samples as the
presence of an age-related shift in the preference for positive over negative
information suggests that positive and negative facial expressions could differ in
how they influence the affective responding of older and younger adults. Age
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differences in patterns of self-reported affective responding did indeed emerge
and were somewhat consistent with overall greater age-related positivity in
response to emotion inductions (Chou et al., 2007). Specifically, in the current
study, younger adults who watched the concerned doctors demonstrated reduced
amusement relative to their age mates who watched the smiling doctors. In
contrast, older adult participants reported similar levels of amusement across the
video conditions and reported marginally greater amusement overall in
comparison to younger adults.
Moreover, no effects of the doctors’ expressions were found on
participants’ fEMG responses to the commercials. Based on previous research, the
positive expressions of the doctors should have elicited greater zygomaticus
activation, whereas the negative expressions should have elicited greater
corrugator activation (Bailey et al., 2009). Importantly, previous research
examining the effect of viewing different facial expressions on fEMG activity has
used only pictures or videos of facial expressions (e.g., Bailey et al., 2009; Hess,
& Blairy, 2001). However, facial EMG activity is sensitive to emotional words
and affective pictures in addition to facial expressions (Lang et al, 1993; Larsen et
al., 2003). Thus, it is possible that the predicted fEMG responses to smiling and
concerned faces were obscured by the fEMG responses to the complex audio
message, which included affectively mixed messages regarding risks and benefits.
Unlike Study 1, in which the affective responses to the faces were due to
only the facial posing task, affective responses in Study 2 could have been due to
the messages that were in the commercials. Thus, future research using complex
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stimuli (affective faces and messages) may consider asking participants how
specific components of a commercial made them feel. For instance, participants
could be asked “how did the doctors in the commercial make you feel?”
separately from “how did the information in the commercial make you feel?”.
Furthermore, to fully understand the differential effects of the audio and visual
components of the commercials, future studies should present participants with
affective videos and recorded messages at separate times in order to isolate
affective responses to each type of stimuli.
Impact of Present Research on Understanding How Emotional Facial
Expressions can Influence Risk-Related Decisions and Evaluations
In Study 1, it was predicted that relative to the other facial posing
conditions, participants would mistakenly select more safe bonds (i.e., be more
risk averse) when they posed the negative fear faces. Participants were also
expected to make more risk-seeking mistakes when they posed the positive
affective expressions (happy) relative to the other posing conditions. Although
these predictions were based on the previously described relations between
incidental affect and risk-related decision making, the facial posing manipulation
did not have the predicted effect on risk-related decision making.
Furthermore, the predictions made regarding the moderating role of
affective responding on the relationship between the posing condition and riskrelated decision making were not supported. Interestingly though, a relationship
did emerge between fEMG activity and risk seeking in the neutral condition.
Although participants were instructed to pose the neutral faces, decreased
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corrugator activation and increased zygomaticus activation were related to
increased risk seeking. It is possible that fEMG activity during the posing of
neutral faces was evidence of feeling states that were not consciously recognized.
If this were the case, fEMG may be more sensitive than other self-report measures
of emotion, especially in decision making research that aims to assess how
affective responses to facial or other emotional stimuli can guide risky decision
making.
Although unexpected, the associations between facial responding and risk
seeking were consistent with previous research linking corrugator (vs.
zygomaticus) activity to negative (vs. positive) affect, which is associated to
decreased (vs. increased) risk seeking. This study is among the first to link fEMG
responses to risk-related decision making in a manner that reflects the previously
defined relations between affective experiences and risk seeking. Thus, Study 2
demonstrated the potential utility of fEMG measures in decision-making research.
In contrast to Study 1, Study 2 did not find any relations between
participants’ fEMG activity and their changes in evaluations of the flu or the flu
vaccine. Nonetheless, the study demonstrated that viewing incidentally presented
facial expressions can influence evaluations of unrelated targets such as the flu or
flu vaccines. Compared to those who watched the smiling doctors, older and
younger adults who watched the concerned doctors felt more positively about the
vaccine. Moreover, older adults who watched the smiling doctors reported
increased worry about the flu relative to those who watched the concerned
doctors. Despite these effects, the complexity of the video stimuli makes it
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difficult to determine exactly why participants’ evaluations differed across the
commercial conditions. Further research is needed to explore the possibility that
feelings toward a target (e.g., a vaccine) are influenced by the congruence
between the affective and informational components of a message about that
target. Such research could reveal whether incongruent information results in
more negative evaluations. Further research with actual behavioral outcomes is
necessary before it can be considered that concerned rather than happy facial
expressions accompany health information may be more effective at increasing
preventative behavior.
Conclusion
Despite the limitations and further questions that arise from the findings of
the present studies, this research has made small yet informative contributions to
understanding how facial expressions can influence evaluations and decisions
related to risky or uncertain prospects. Specifically, Study 1 suggests that fEMG
may be a useful tool when attempting to evaluate how participants’ affective
responses to stimuli relate to their risk seeking behavior in financial decision
tasks. Study 2 suggests that facial expression can have a direct effect on
participants’ general affective evaluations such as those pertaining to feelings
rather than more cognitive evaluations of specific attributes (e.g., risks/benefits).
Furthermore, the findings of Study 2 open the door for future research examining
whether concerned rather than smiling facial expressions may be differentially
effective in promoting more positive evaluations of the flu vaccine. More
generally, it is proposed that future research may benefit from including fEMG
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measures in order to examine the influence of incidentally presented facial
expression on evaluations and decisions involving risk.
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Appendix B
mDES state
In any given circumstance, people often have a number of different feelings. Please indicate how
much of each emotion you feel right now, that is, at the present moment.

not at all

a little bit

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

1. amusement

1
O

2
O

3
O

4
O

5
O

2. hope

O

O

O

O

O

3. fear

O

O

O

O

O

4. guilt

O

O

O

O

O

5. sadness

O

O

O

O

O

6. compassion

O

O

O

O

O

7. awe

O

O

O

O

O

8. anger

O

O

O

O

O

9. surprise

O

O

O

O

O

10. joy

O

O

O

O

O

11. shame

O

O

O

O

O

12. contempt

O

O

O

O

O

13. love

O

O

O

O

O

14. pride

O

O

O

O

O

15. contentment

O

O

O

O

O

16. embarrassment

O

O

O

O

O

17. interest

O

O

O

O

O

18. disgust

O

O

O

O

O

19. gratitude

O

O

O

O

O
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Appendix C
Please answer for the following questions to the best of your ability.
1. Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1, 000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many
times do you think the die would come up even?
Answer: _____________
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize is 1%. What
is your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people
each buy a single BIG BUCKS ticket?
Answer: _____________
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in
1,000. What percent of tickets in the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a
car?
Answer: _____________
4. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease?
(mark one)
___ 1 in 100
___ 1 in 1000
___ 1 in 10
5. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease?
(mark one)
___ 1%
___ 10%
___ 5%
6. If Person A’s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and person B’s risk is
double that of A’s, what is B’s risk?
Answer: _____________
7. If Person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and person B’s risk
is double that of A’s, what is B’s risk?
Answer: _____________
8. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get
the disease?
A: Out of 100? _________________________
B: Out of 1000? ________________________
9. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having a
____% chance of getting the disease.
Answer: _____________
10. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10,000 people, about how
many people are expected to get infected? Answer: _____________
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Appendix D

Pre-Flu Questionnaire

136

** Questions 1, and 10-15 are asked to older adults only as distraction
questions.
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Appendix E
Post-Commercial Questionnaire
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Appendix F
Flu Commercial Script:
Stay healthy this flu season by getting vaccinated. An annual flu vaccine is the
best way to reduce your chances of getting and spreading the flu.
The "flu," is a contagious infection that affects the respiratory system. Symptoms
include fever, cough, sore throat, runny nose, body aches, chills and fatigue.
Remember, the flu can easily be avoided with a simple vaccination that can allow
you to keep your life on track this flu season.
Influenza is a serious disease that can lead to hospitalization. Even healthy people
can get very sick from the flu and spread it to their friends, family, and coworkers.
Protect yourself and your community before the coming flu season. Don’t let the
flu slow you down!
Side effects of the flu vaccine include Soreness, redness, or swelling at the site of
the inoculation. A low-grade fever and aches.

